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  INTRODUCTION   
Administrative enforcement, especially the use of large civ-
il penalties, is on the upswing. In recent years, administrative 
agencies have imposed historically large civil penalties on an 
agency-by-agency basis. In January 2014, as part of the resolu-
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tion of the Madoff scandal, J.P. Morgan Chase paid $461 mil-
lion to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a record for 
that agency.
1
 In June 2012, Barclays Bank agreed to pay a $200 
million civil penalty to the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission (CFTC) for interest rate manipulation, the largest pen-
alty imposed in CFTC history.
2
 Just weeks before, the Office of 
Foreign Asset Control of the Department of Treasury imposed a 
record $619 million dollar penalty on ING Bank in connection 
with a joint investigation with the Department of Justice relat-
ing to transactions with Cuban and Iranian clients.
3
 Another 
branch of the Department of Treasury, the Office of the Comp-
troller of Currency, levied its largest penalty in its history in 
December 2012, a $500 million dollar sanction against HSBC 
Bank for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.
4
  
The frequency of these cases is striking. The dollar figures 
are big and the number of cases large, but the breadth of agen-
cies involved is equally significant. We see many different 
agencies bringing enforcement actions. This is the result of a 
key structural choice in federal civil enforcement. In general, at 
the federal level, regulatory enforcement is decentralized and 
spread across specialist agencies. Enforcement power is dele-
gated to a range of administrative agencies with subject matter 
expertise. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Nucle-
ar Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Office of Foreign As-
set Control (among many others) all have enforcement arms fo-
 
 1. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2014-1 (Dep’t of Treasury Jan. 
7, 2014) (assessing civil penalty), available at http://www.fincen.gov/ 
news_room/ea/files/JPMorgan_ASSESSMENT_01072014.pdf. The payment 
was part of a broader global settlement with the Department of Justice and 
other regulators. See Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Settles Its Madoff Tab, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304887104579306323011059460. 
 2. See CFTC Orders Barclays To Pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted 
Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning LIBOR and Euribor Bench-
mark Interest Rates, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURE TRADING COMMISSION (June 
27, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12; see also 
Barclays To Pay Largest Fine in CFTC History, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/barclays-to-pay-largest-civil-fine-in-cftc 
-history. 
 3. ING Bank N.V. Agrees To Forfeit $619 Million for Illegal Transactions 
with Cuban and Iranian Entities, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. (June 12, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-742.html. 
 4. OCC Assesses $500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A., U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www2.occ.gov/ 
news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-173.html.  
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cused on the agency’s regulatory subject matter.
5
  
Why structure enforcement this way, with the power to 
bring cases divided among many agencies focused on different 
industries? The standard answer is that we assume expert 
agencies are the entities best suited to enforce in their regula-
tory domains. Agencies draft the regulations and are staffed 
with industry experts. Academics, judges, and Congress see en-
forcement as deeply entangled with the agency’s other mis-
sions. Expertise in enforcement follows from the agency’s other 
capacities. We assume that subject matter expertise will ensure 
the appropriate enforcement of statutes. Because, for example, 
the SEC has specialized knowledge about the securities indus-
try, the standard view is this expertise gives it the ability to 
identify and investigate the right violations, bring the correct 
enforcement actions, and extract the appropriate penalties. 
This assumed superiority of specialized enforcement has 
gone largely unexamined. This silence is rather surprising, be-
cause criminal enforcement has taken a very different ap-
proach. Federal criminal enforcement is centralized in a gener-
alist agency. The DOJ retains a monopoly on criminal 
prosecutions regardless of the substantive area regulated by 
the statute. Cases ranging from narcotics and violent crime to 
criminal antitrust and securities fraud are charged, litigated, 
and settled by a single unified agency.
6
 Furthermore, the DOJ 
is charged with enforcement as its central mission, largely to 
the exclusion of other tasks.
7
 Unlike regulatory agencies, DOJ 
 
 5. See 2015 OFAC Recent Actions, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http:// 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/OFAC 
-Recent-Actions.aspx (last updated Feb. 17, 2015); Division of Enforcement, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/enforce (last modified 
Mar. 18, 2014); Enforcement, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 
COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/lawregulation/enforcement/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2015); Enforcement, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, http:// 
www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement.html (last updated Oct. 20, 
2014). 
 6. See, e.g., U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Criminal Division, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/criminal.html (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2015). United States Attorney’s Offices, the primary litigating 
units of the Department of Justice, are geographically decentralized, which 
can lead to subject-matter specialization. For instance, the United States At-
torney’s Office for the Southern District of New York has a particular exper-
tise in securities cases. Despite this role that geography plays in enforcement, 
enforcement policy is set and controlled centrally in the United States De-
partment of Justice in Washington, D.C., and all of the offices have the capaci-
ty to prosecute a range of substantive crimes.  
 7. The Department’s mission statement reflects this focus: To enforce the 
law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to en-
sure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal 
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neither drafts the substantive criminal statutes it enforces nor 
issues interpretations of those statutes that have the force of 
law.
8
  
This Article challenges the claim that specialization is al-
ways superior. First, I demonstrate that enforcement itself is 
an area of expertise not wholly intertwined with subject matter 
expertise. Part I introduces the assumption by scholars, Con-
gress, and the judiciary that agencies will be expert in en-
forcement because of their specialized knowledge, but as Part II 
demonstrates, core enforcement questions about how to inves-
tigate cases and which violations to charge are frequently inde-
pendent of the substantive regulatory area. Agencies that make 
these decisions well are apt to be able to do so in different areas 
of law. As a result, the value of specialized knowledge about an 
industry trades off against specialized knowledge about en-
forcement.  
Part III explores the structural consequences of specializa-
tion. In addition to costs and benefits based on knowledge, spe-
cialized enforcement brings structural strengths and weak-
nesses. Part III initially outlines two challenges faced by 
specialized enforcers that generalist agencies are more likely to 
avoid. First, specialists are more vulnerable to political pres-
sure. In ordinary times, regulatory capture can produce 
underenforcement. Following major enforcement failures, 
though, the political salience of enforcement switches and 
overenforcement can result. Second, specialized enforcement 
inevitably suffers from a silo effect. The agency can only control 
the direct consequences of its own enforcement action, while 
the enforcement target considers all of the potential effects. 
These collateral effects include the possibility of subsequent 
civil litigation and enforcement actions by other regulators. 
This silo effect distorts the outcomes of specialized enforce-
ment.  
These weaknesses have countervailing benefits. A central 
goal of any enforcement regime is norm reinforcement—
agencies want to build norms of compliance within firms. Agen-
cies that are closer to the substantive regulatory area are bet-
 
leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for 
those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial admin-
istration of justice for all Americans. About DOJ, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2015). 
 8. For an argument in favor of an alternative approach, see Dan M. 
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 
488–92 (1996) (arguing for a delegation of interpretive power to the Depart-
ment of Justice).  
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ter situated to learn these norms and help them develop. Spe-
cialist enforcement agencies also have more options than gen-
eralists. Within the structure of specialized agencies, enforce-
ment authorities are under the supervision of the rule-making 
authority. As a result, agencies have a choice of mechanisms to 
alter the behavior of regulated entities. They can change the 
substantive rule or bring an enforcement action.  
These costs and benefits mean that specialist enforcement 
is likely to be superior in some cases but not in others. In par-
ticular, Part IV argues that we need to approach specialized en-
forcement carefully. First, Congress now follows a default rule. 
New regulatory agencies, like the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau, get civil enforcement authority as part of their statuto-
ry authorization with little thought. A careful tradeoff of the 
costs and benefits, though, suggest that agency enforcement 
should only be specialized so far. For some agencies, like the 
SEC and the CFTC, a merger of the enforcement arms might 
produce significant returns. Second, the judicial branch needs 
to think about comparative deference. The judiciary strongly 
defers to agency enforcement choices based on an assumption of 
expertise. The costs and benefits of specialization, though, sug-
gest that deference should be weaker as agencies become more 
specialized. Finally, agencies themselves need to closely coordi-
nate their enforcement efforts, both in individual cases and at 
the level of policy, in order to allow the strengths of specialized 
enforcement to show through while overcoming its weaknesses.  
I.  THE STRUCTURAL CHOICE OF AGENCY 
ENFORCEMENT   
Agency structure affects regulatory outcomes. This basic 
concept has a long pedigree in the political science literature
9
 
and is now widely recognized in the legal literature as well. 
Scholars have started to consider the questions of the size and 
scope of agencies, whether authority should be centralized or 
decentralized, and the costs and benefits of overlapping agency 
authority.
10
 The enforcement function is no exception. How ad-
 
 9. See, e.g., Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political 
Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 664 (1998); Matthew D. 
McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Poli-
tics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of 
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 481 (1989); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll 
& Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures As Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 273–74 (1987). 
 10. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1138 (2012); Anne Joseph 
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ministrative agency enforcement should be structured is begin-
ning to receive considerable academic attention.  
A key debate has focused on who should enforce. How 
many enforcers should be given the responsibility for policing 
and preventing violations? One option is centralized enforce-
ment. A single administrative agency, such as the SEC, can be 
given an enforcement monopoly, and alternative enforcers, 
such as private class action lawyers, can be excluded. Alterna-
tively, enforcement might be decentralized. Multiple federal en-
forcers could have the authority to bring enforcement actions. 
State enforcers, such as Attorneys General and private class 
action attorneys, can join and supplement the enforcement ef-
fort.
11
  
These arguments typically focus on the relative risk of 
overenforcement and underenforcement. Advocates of centrali-
zation, starting with Professor William Landes and Richard 
Posner, emphasize the problems of overenforcement and 
overdeterrence.
12
 In a world of decentralized enforcement, regu-
latory targets face the possibility of repetitive investigations, 
either simultaneous or sequential, seeking to punish the same 
violation. Multiple enforcement actions by state or federal regu-
lators (or a private class action following a public enforcement 
action) will produce multiple sanctions. Without careful coordi-
nation, these multiple sanctions might well exceed the optimal 
level of punishment for a given violation. In this way, decen-
tralization can produce overpunishment and overdeterrence. 
Centralizing enforcement in a single federal administrative 
agency prevents this outcome. 
On the other hand, decentralization advocates emphasize 
the mechanism of regulatory capture. Regulated entities, of 
course, often work to influence and gain control over their regu-
lator. In the enforcement arena, this pressure from capture 
pushes public enforcers in the direction of less enforcement. If 
 
O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing 
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1674 (2006).  
 11. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 698, 699–704 (2011); Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National 
Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1366 (2013).  
 12. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of 
Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15–16 (1975). For more recent discussions, see 
James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and Competition To Enforce the Securities 
Laws, 100 CAL. L. REV. 115, 121–22 (2012) (describing the relevant literature 
on competitive enforcement and over and underdeterrence), and Amanda M. 
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical 
Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2200–03 (2010).  
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enforcement is centralized in a single federal agency, capture 
can produce underenforcement and underdeterrence. Addition-
al enforcers can counteract capture by bringing their resources 
to bear and competing with the primary public enforcer.
13
 De-
centralization thus allows other entities to supplement the en-
forcement efforts of the primary administrative agency.
14
 
Notice what is missing from this debate—the possibility 
that federal agencies should not enforce at all. Even scholars 
recognizing the complexity of the centraliza-
tion/decentralization debate tend to assume that a specialized 
federal enforcer is inevitable.
15
 The right model may be one 
where enforcement authority is consolidated in a single enforc-
er but one that specializes in enforcement itself to the exclusion 
of other tasks. Rather than spread enforcement authority 
across multiple potential actors, or combine enforcement goals 
with other agency goals, we should consider a third option. An 
agency that treats enforcement as its primary and exclusive 
task should be viewed a viable structural choice.  
Perhaps the absence of this option in the literature should 
not be a surprise. When setting out the doctrines that govern 
administrative enforcement, Congress and the Supreme Court 
have repeatedly started with a key assumption that has shaped 
the law. Both the legislature and the judicial branch assume 
that agencies will be expert in enforcement because they are 
expert in their statutes, their industries, and their regulatory 
scheme. This belief has heavily influenced both the initial Con-
gressional authorization of agency enforcement and the subse-
quent judicial review of its use.  
At the front end, Congress makes the first choice. It de-
cides whether to grant agencies the power to enforce the stat-
utes they administer. Most famously, it seriously considered 
the question of whether to give the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) enforcement authority. As initially 
structured, the EEOC lacked the ability to bring enforcement 
actions.
16
 As part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
 
 13. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 58 (2010); see also Lemos, 
supra note 11, at 717–20. 
 14. For a recent introduction to the general debate over centralized and 
decentralized enforcement, see Rose, supra note 11, at 1351–59. 
 15. See id. at 1359 (identifying the context-specific value of overlapping 
enforcement); Park, supra note 12, at 172–78 (recognizing that value of multi-
ple enforcers depends on the legal rule at issue). 
 16. See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why The EEOC (Still) Mat-
ters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671, 672–74 (2005). 
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1972, Congress expanded its powers and gave it the ability to 
bring actions directly against employers.
17
 
The legislative history supported this grant of enforcement 
authority largely based on the expertise of the agency in the 
subject of its regulatory jurisdiction: employment discrimina-
tion. Congress authorized the agency to seek cease-and-desist 
orders because of the complex nature of discrimination in indi-
vidual employment environments.
18
 Similarly, it transferred 
the authority to bring pattern and practice cases from the DOJ 
to the EEOC because the agency “has access to the most cur-
rent statistical computations and analyses regarding employ-
ment patterns and has the most extensive expertise in dealing 
with employment discrimination.”
19
 The EEOC’s expert under-
standing of discrimination was also an important basis for giv-
ing it enforcement authority over its sister federal agencies.
20
  
In addition to shaping the initial choice about design, the 
response of the judicial branch to agency enforcement choices 
relies on this presumed connection between agency mission and 
enforcement expertise. Most significantly, the federal courts 
have held that key agency enforcement choices are largely non-
reviewable. This deference rests on the same assumption. 
Courts see enforcement decisions as arising out of the agency’s 
specialized knowledge and understanding of its regulatory sys-
tem. Take, for example, the decision not to bring an enforce-
ment action. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court held that it would 
generally not review agency decisions not to enforce since that 
decision “often involves a complicated balancing of a number of 
factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.”
21
 
Because the Court believed that the questions relevant to the 
non-enforcement decision were deeply linked to other agency 
choices, the expertise of the agency deserved deference.
22
  
Other components of agency enforcement receive similar 
 
 17. Id. at 677; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (authorizing a civil ac-
tion). 
 18. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 8 (1971) (“It is increasingly obvious that 
the entire area of employment discrimination is one whose resolution requires 
not only expert assistance, but also the technical perception that a problem 
exists in the first place, and that the system complained of is unlawful.”). 
 19. Id. at 14. 
 20. Id. at 25 (“Because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
is the expert agency in the field of employment discrimination and because it 
is an independent agency removed from the administration of Federal em-
ployment, it is the most logical place for the enforcement power to be vested.”). 
 21. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
 22. Id. at 831–32. 
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treatment for the same reason. The Supreme Court defers to 
agency choices about remedies and penalties. Agency penalty 
decisions receive a very deferential standard on later judicial 
review because “the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a 
matter for administrative competence.”
23
 Similarly, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
strongly defers to agency decisions to settle enforcement ac-
tions. Such “judgments—arising from considerations of re-
source allocation, agency priorities, and costs of alternatives—
are well within the agency’s expertise and discretion.”
24
 At vir-
tually every stage of administrative enforcement, agencies have 
broad and largely unconstrained authority because courts and 
Congress assume that their expertise in their subject matter 
and regulatory mission makes them experts in enforcing their 
statutes and rules. 
II.  ENFORCEMENT AS A SPECIALIZATION   
Are Congress and the courts correct? Does enforcement ex-
pertise follow from the other components of agency expertise? 
Not always. This Part argues that many enforcement questions 
are general in nature, not specialized. Regardless of the subject 
matter of the action, repeated issues arise in enforcement ac-
tions. Agencies that focus on enforcement, rather than simply 
have enforcement as one task of many, are likely to do better in 
answering these questions.  
Each Section in this Part looks at connected issues involv-
ing charging decisions and enforcement discretion. Section A 
considers the choice about which potential defendants are 
charged with a particular focus on corporate charging decisions. 
Civil regulatory enforcers commonly need to choose whether to 
charge the individuals who actually committed the violation, 
the corporation where they worked, or both. Section B exam-
ines the exercise of discretion in the remedy sought once the 
charging decision is made. Enforcers need to decide which cases 
need a large penalty and which deserve a more modest sanc-
tion. Section C focuses on the opposite of penalties—benefits 
conferred on individuals as part of the enforcement process. En-
forcers must choose how to protect whistleblowers, appropriate-
ly reduce charges for cooperators involved in the violation, and 
reward others who provide information. 
 
 23. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185 (1973) (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 24. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 494 F.3d 1027, 
1032 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
2122 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:2113 
 
For each of these three areas, I make two points. First, 
while each choice involves considering some subject-specific in-
formation, a large component of the agency’s decision is subject 
matter independent. These three areas involve considerations 
requiring expertise in enforcement, not just in the regulatory 
subject matter. As a result, we face a tradeoff. We should ex-
pect generalist enforcers to be better at the general questions 
and specialized enforcers to be better at the subject-specific 
questions.  
Second, successful enforcement policies in all three areas 
require communication with the regulated community. Regula-
tory targets need to know not only what conduct will be penal-
ized, but also to what extent. Potential witnesses need to know 
what will happen to them if they come forward. As a theoretical 
matter, we should expect a generalist enforcer to be better at 
establishing and communicating policies on these matters. In-
deed, in practice, in each area, the DOJ has clear policies in 
place for handling criminal cases, while agencies frequently do 
not. In each of these areas, at best, federal agencies frequently 
reinvent the wheel. At worst, they never invent it in the first 
place.  
A. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: WHO? 
Enforcers must first decide the scope of liability. This ini-
tial charging decision requires a choice about which defendants 
to pursue and which defendants to ignore. As a practical mat-
ter, every enforcement agency sees more violations than it can 
charge, so some potential defendants will be allowed to es-
cape.
25
 These decisions are perhaps the classic example of pros-
ecutorial discretion by public enforcers. This choice belongs to 
the enforcement agency alone. Both in the civil and criminal 
context, decisions not to charge are effectively unreviewable.
26
  
This initial charging decision certainly has subject-specific 
attributes. A common consideration in this choice is the severi-
ty of the violation. Enforcers generally wish to pursue serious 
violations while allowing more minor or technical misconduct to 
 
 25. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (“[Pros-
ecutors] must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal 
justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious 
criminal charge.”). 
 26. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (discussing civil regulatory enforcement); 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–25 (1979) (discussing criminal 
enforcement). 
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go unpunished.
27
 Safety regulators, for obvious reasons, usually 
prioritize especially risky conduct for enforcement action while 
taking less aggressive action against activities that impose 
lower risks. This discretionary choice requires expert 
knowledge of the field of operation. For instance, experts in 
mine safety are necessary to determine which types of conduct 
impose substantial risk to the health of miners and which types 
of violations are less likely to cause harm.
28
  
Despite these subject-specific aspects of enforcement, other 
major components of the exercise of charging discretion are 
more general. For example, state and federal administrative 
agencies often sanction corporations for regulatory violations. 
Corporate misconduct invariably can be traced to employee 
misconduct.
29
 Some individual always caused the violation 
through either action or omission.  
This structural feature of corporations poses a hard ques-
tion for enforcers: Who should be punished? Enforcers usually 
have options. They can charge the company with a violation, or 
they can charge the individual, or they can charge both.  
There is a large literature on the merits of charging corpo-
rations for violations. As a general matter, corporations are re-
sponsible for both civil and criminal actions of their employees 
as a matter of respondeat superior.
30
 This basic rule has certain-
ly been widely criticized.
31
 To the extent that punishment is re-
tributive in nature, justifying corporate penalties raises compli-
cated questions. Determining whether the corporation had the 
necessary mens rea is a difficult endeavor. Is the entity charged 
with the mental state of all employees or merely upper man-
agement? Similarly, retributive punishment is often justified 
 
 27. See generally Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 853, 880–87 (2012) (describing the role of violation severity in agency 
penalty calculations). 
 28. The Mine Safety and Health Administration uses risk of harm as a 
central input into penalty determinations. See 30 C.F.R. § 100.3(e) (2014).  
 29. See United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir. 1991). See 
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (discussing 
agency relationships). 
 30. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 
U.S. 481, 494–95 (1909) (discussing criminal liability); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. c (discussing tort liability).  
 31. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 386, 447–48 (1981); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What 
Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1493–94 (1996); see also Brent 
Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, 
and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1180–83 (1983). 
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on the basis that it reinforces social norms of compliance. If 
blameworthy violations are punished, regulated entities will 
make more of an effort to comply with the law. In the corporate 
context, though, punishment can and does occur even when the 
violation expressly transgressed corporate policy.
32
  
Similar and equally difficult questions arise if penalties are 
designed to deter. For example, the division between ownership 
and control in the corporate context means that the stockhold-
ers effectively bear the punishment for any violation, even 
though they do not make the choice to violate the rule and may 
have taken steps to prevent it.
33
 Corporate penalties may in-
duce aggressive compliance programs to avoid violations and 
punishment, but they might not. Internal investigations may 
unearth misconduct the government would never find. In a 
strict vicarious liability regime where companies are held liable 
for the violations they uncover, companies may prefer to turn a 
blind eye rather than look closely at their own practices.
34
 On 
the other hand, for all but the smallest penalties, charging in-
dividuals may be unrealistic.
35
 Only the corporate defendant 
can pay the price necessary to internalize the costs imposed. 
The difficult questions of corporate liability extend beyond 
a simple binary decision to charge or not. Very frequently, the 
threat of corporate charges becomes an enforcement tool to 
move investigations forward and obtain other concessions from 
the corporation.
36
 Potential corporate defendants have strong 
incentives to cooperate with the government to avoid charges 
against the entity. At the initial stage, this cooperation often 
takes the form of an internal investigation, the results of which 
are provided to the government to assist in its efforts to target 
individual employees.
37
 Later on, the corporation may enter in-
to agreements to defer prosecution in exchange for hiring moni-
 
 32. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Lia-
bility, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 526–27 (2006). 
 33. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways To Think About the Punish-
ment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2009); John Hasnas, 
The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2009). 
 34. See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Crim-
inal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994). 
 35. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Mis-
conduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 
695 & n.21 (1997). 
 36. Lisa Kern Griffin, Inside Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE 
BOARDROOM 110, 110–11 (Anthony Barkow & Rachel Barkow eds., 2011).  
 37. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 1613, 1630–33 (2007). 
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tors to ensure future compliance or to engage in other structur-
al reforms.
38
  
These are powerful tools for the government but are highly 
controversial. At the investigatory stage, prosecutors can insert 
themselves in the employer-employee relationship in signifi-
cant ways. While the government cannot force employees to 
speak, employers can compel statements on the threat of ter-
mination.
39
 Similarly, deferred prosecution arrangements put 
the government between corporations and their shareholders. 
External monitors strip away some of the control traditionally 
held by the equity owners of corporations. 
These questions about corporate liability are hard—they 
have no easy answers. They do have a common characteristic, 
though. They are largely independent of the subject matter of 
the enforcement action.
40
 Whether the enforcement action in-
volves the SEC or the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, the appropriate apportionment of penalties be-
tween individuals and the company will not depend exclusively 
on the intricacies of the securities or pipeline industries. In 
both cases, either the corporate mental state problem is too 
great to justify punishment or the blaming function of penalties 
successfully reinforces the right norms. Additionally, whether 
and when the threat of corporate charges can be used to inves-
tigate or obtain compliance does not turn on the substance of 
the violation. At the core, these corporate charging questions 
are general enforcement issues and are largely independent of 
the subject matter.  
Because these issues are general in nature, we should ex-
pect a generalist agency to have policies in place to handle 
them. Indeed, the DOJ has set out charging guidelines for cor-
porate prosecutions. In 1999, Deputy Attorney General Eric 
Holder promulgated the first set of guidelines outlining when 
federal prosecutors should bring charges against corporations 
for misconduct committed by their employees.
41
 The corpora-
 
 38. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate 
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 323 (2007); Peter Spivack & Sujit 
Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecu-
tion Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 166–67 (2008). 
 39. Buell, supra note 37, at 1634. 
 40. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime, 
in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 12 (recognizing that 
the basic law and economics framework of corporate enforcement “applies 
across the wide array of offenses for which corporations may be held accounta-
ble”). 
 41. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
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tion’s compliance program played a key role in determining 
whether the corporation would be charged, as did the corporate 
response to the investigation and cooperation with law en-
forcement.
42
 Over the last fifteen years, the DOJ has frequently 
updated and modified its approach to respond to problems and 
reflect changes in policy priorities.
43
 
In contrast, agency approaches to this decision are far less 
clear. Agencies rarely have clearly established policies explain-
ing when they will charge the organization, when they will 
charge the individual, or when they will charge both. Consider 
the SEC, frequently seen as one of the most effective and well-
run federal enforcement agencies. The SEC has not clearly ex-
plained when it will charge individuals and when it will charge 
corporations. Not surprisingly, this lack of clarity produces un-
certainty about the agency’s policy.
44
  
Moreover, the empirical evidence on the SEC’s actual prac-
tice suggests that there may not be consistency in the agency’s 
choices. Individuals are frequently charged,
45
 but in cases in-
volving the largest entities and most significant violations, the 
agency is far more likely to rely on corporate charges.
46
 The new 
Chair of the SEC has suggested that enforcement may be shift-
 
tice, to U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 
16, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/ 
reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Current DOJ policy is incorporated in the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-
28.000 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp 
-charging-guidelines.pdf. 
 44. See Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, SEC Practice in Targeting 
and Penalizing Individual Defendants (Sept. 3, 2013), https://blogs.law 
.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/sec-practice-in-targeting-and-penalizing 
-individual-defendants (“[I]t seems that commentators assume that the prac-
tice in question is the predominant practice of the SEC—for example, the SEC 
predominantly goes after the corporation rather than individuals, or the SEC 
predominantly goes after low level employees rather than the corporation.”). 
 45. Id. (“[O]nly 7 percent of cases involved no individual defendants. Fo-
cusing solely on cases involving at least one fraud count, only 4 percent of cas-
es involved no individual defendants. In the remainder of cases, the SEC 
named either individual defendants only or it named both the corporation and 
individual defendants.”). 
 46. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from 
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 700–01 (2012). Cases 
involving larger firms certainly may involve different types of violations and 
different evidentiary issues, yet “violation types and lack of adequate evidence 
. . . do not fully account for the extensive use of these actions by the SEC.” Id. 
at 701. 
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ing toward more actions against individuals.
47
 Of course, these 
statements do not provide the level of guidance or clarity pre-
sent in a formal policy. They also do not provide a commitment 
of direction beyond the Chair’s tenure in office.  
At this point in the charging process, then, specialized en-
forcement comes with costs and benefits. Specialists have an 
advantage at the specialized components of enforcement, in-
cluding identifying the severity of the violation and whether it 
should to be punished or ignored. Generalists have an ad-
vantage at the generalist aspects of enforcement, such as 
whether to charge the corporation, the individuals, or both. 
These advantages reflect a tradeoff, suggesting that neither 
structural choice is always preferable in reaching the optimal 
initial charging decision.  
B. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: HOW MUCH? 
Once enforcers select among the potential defendants and 
decide that some penalty should be sought, they must turn to 
the question of how much punishment. What will be the ulti-
mate outcome of the enforcement action? Unlike the initial 
charging decision, this choice does not belong simply to the en-
forcement agency. Enforcers retain substantial influence, but 
other actors play a role. In cases that are brought in district 
court, like most criminal cases and many civil enforcement ac-
tions, the district judge generally determines the penalty im-
posed. Even in cases that proceed purely administratively, the 
agency as a whole decides the ultimate penalty, not the en-
forcement branch. Finally (and most importantly), the vast ma-
jority of enforcement actions end in settlement, so the ultimate 
penalty involves a negotiation between the government and the 
defendant. Of course, these settlement negotiations occur with 
an eye toward the likely result if the case is fully litigated.
48
 
In this second stage of enforcement discretion, other play-
 
 47. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, SEC Exec. Comm., Deploying the Full 
Enforcement Arsenal, Speech to the Council of Institutional Investors (Sept. 
26, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/ 
1370539841202 (“I have made it clear that the staff should look hard to see 
whether a case against individuals can be brought. I want to be sure we are 
looking first at the individual conduct and working out to the entity, rather 
than starting with the entity as a whole and working in. It is a subtle shift, 
but one that could bring more individuals into enforcement cases.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection 
of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 190 (1993); Robert H. 
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of 
Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 93, 95–102 (1992). 
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ers may have a voice, but the public enforcer usually has the 
loudest one. A district judge rarely will set a penalty higher 
than the one proposed by the government. Similarly, settle-
ment negotiations will end up at a point between the outcomes 
the parties see as most desirable. The penalty will be lower 
than the government’s preferred outcome but higher than the 
defendant’s. As a result, even at this stage, the enforcer can ef-
fectively set an upper limit on the ultimate penalty. If a civil 
enforcement agency seeks a $15 million civil penalty, that fig-
ure will provide a cap on the recovery. The case will certainly 
be resolved, at trial or by settlement, for that amount or some-
thing less.  
As is true for the initial charging decision, the enforcement 
agency needs to decide how much punishment to seek. The 
agency needs a mechanism to calculate its penalty position. In 
cases involving a term of years or a financial penalty, the agen-
cy needs to decide on a number. Is this a $15 million case or a 
$50 million case? Even if the ultimate resolution will be injunc-
tive in nature, the agency needs to decide how harsh an injunc-
tion to seek. Will the target be barred from the industry tempo-
rarily or permanently? In the language of the criminal law, 
enforcement agencies need theories of punishment.  
Agencies have a range of theories to select from. For exam-
ple, they might primarily focus on deterrence. If so, penalties 
should be imposed in a manner sensitive to the economic effects 
of violations. Pure deterrence theories assume regulated enti-
ties are rational, wealth-maximizing, and comply with regula-
tion only when the penalties for violations are sufficiently 
large. Compliance occurs if the expected punishment exceeds 
the gain from the violation.
49
 In this framework, enforcers can 
set the penalties either to require the violator to internalize the 
costs caused by the violation
50
 or deter it completely.
51
 These 
approaches require the enforcer to think carefully about the 
probability that the violation will be detected and punished, the 
harm or gain produced by the misconduct, and (for corporate 
defendants) the extent of compliance efforts.
52
  
Alternatively, enforcers might not be interested in deter-
 
 49. See Minzner, supra note 27, at 860. 
 50. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169, 190–93 (1968). 
 51. Minzner, supra note 27, at 860–61. 
 52. See id. at 859. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Con-
trolling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). 
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rence at all. Enforcers might care about retribution instead. 
Penalties set with an eye toward retribution take very different 
inputs than those calculating purely on a deterrence basis. The 
probability of detection, for example, drops out of the penalty 
calculation entirely.
53
 While retributivists might care about 
harm and gain, the central concern of retributive theories is the 
mental state of the defendant.
54
 Penalties increase with more 
culpable mental states and decline or disappear when the de-
fendant’s state of mind is less blameworthy. Defendants who 
intentionally cause harm deserve more punishment than those 
doing so inadvertently.
55
 Penalty policies for retributive enforc-
ers require a close analysis of gradations in a defendant’s state 
of mind and an adjustment to reflect those differences.  
Of course, these goals are not exclusive. Agencies might 
care about some mix of retribution and deterrence. There is no 
easy answer about which of these theories should drive crimi-
nal or civil enforcement. However, both the decisions about 
theories of punishment and the implementation of those theo-
ries are generalist enforcement functions. To a significant de-
gree, they do not depend on the regulatory subject matter. 
Consider fraud enforcement as an example. A wide range 
of agencies can bring actions in cases involving violators de-
frauding victims.
56
 Certainly many aspects of fraud enforce-
ment require significant subject matter expertise. Fraud in the 
securities industry can be quite different than fraud targeting 
Medicaid. However, the penalty calculation in every fraud case 
requires the enforcement agency to return to the same general 
questions. Is this a case about deterrence where the probability 
of detection should play a central role? Is it a case about retri-
bution, where the mental state of the defendant is the primary 
consideration? To what extent should gain or loss drive the ul-
timate punishment?  
Unsurprisingly, these questions largely have answers for 
the Department of Justice. As a result of the combined effect of 
internal DOJ policy and the United States Sentencing Guide-
lines, penalty calculations are largely transparent. Assistant 
 
 53. See Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punish-
ment, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 73–74, 83 (1980) (noting the rejection of detection 
probability in retributive theories of punishment). 
 54. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND 
CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 171 (2009); MICHAEL S. MOORE, 
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 104 (1997).  
 55. MOORE, supra note 54, at 192. 
 56. Darryl K. Brown, The Distribution of Fraud Enforcement, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1593, 1593 (2007). 
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United States Attorneys are mandated to indict defendants for 
the most serious offense consistent with the evidence, defined 
as the offense that produces the highest sentence under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines.
57
 Similarly, when offering 
a plea either before or after indicting a case, the DOJ ordinarily 
requires defendants to plead guilty to the most serious provable 
offense.
58
 The calculation under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines then produces a relatively narrow range of potential 
punishment.
59
  
In contrast, the penalty calculations within specialist 
agencies are often opaque. Administrative agencies frequently 
provide no guidance on the method used to calculate civil pen-
alties. A generic reference to statutory considerations may ap-
pear in the penalty calculation, but the agency provides no clar-
ity about the underlying process.
60
 Even worse, there is some 
evidence that agency penalty calculations are at odds with their 
stated purposes. Elsewhere I examined the penalty policies at 
the Federal Communications Commission, the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the 
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).
61
 Each of the 
agencies has stated that its primary purpose in imposing pen-
alties is deterrence, rejecting retribution as a rationale. Howev-
er, for each agency, the factors considered in the penalty pro-
cess are strongly consistent with a retributive rationale but are 
inconsistent with deterrence-based theories of punishment.
62
  
Like the discretionary decision about who to punish, the 
question of how much punishment is appropriate is not a pure-
ly specialized task. It certainly depends in part on detailed in-
formation about the regulated industry. Specialized agencies 
have a significant advantage at this component of the punish-
ment calculus. However, the relative significance of different 
theories of punishment in the enforcement process, and the 
mechanism used to convert those theories into practice, is a 
question about enforcement generally. Since these skills are in 
tension, we again see a tradeoff in the value of specialist and 
generalist enforcement. 
 
 57. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 43, at 9-27.300. 
 58. Id. at 9-27.330 (preindictment pleas); id. at 9-27.430 (postindictment 
pleas). 
 59. In fraud cases, the gain to the violator or the loss to the victim is the 
primary determinant of the ultimate penalty. See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2014). 
 60. Minzner, supra note 27, at 864–65. 
 61. Id. at 866–67. 
 62. Id. at 869–77. 
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C. REWARDS, WHISTLEBLOWERS, AND COOPERATORS  
Effective enforcement requires information. In practice, the 
best information about violations belongs to those closest to the 
misconduct.
63
 For individual violators, the people best posi-
tioned to provide testimony are friends, neighbors, and co-
conspirators. In the corporate context, employees, both those 
involved in the violation and those nearby, are invaluable to ef-
fective enforcers.  
As a result, enforcement agencies are often faced with the 
difficult decision of whether and how to provide the appropriate 
incentives to expose this information. One approach is to im-
pose a cost on those who conceal the information. For example, 
the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act created affirmative reporting ob-
ligations for high-level corporate executives.
64
 For these indi-
viduals, concealing evidence of securities fraud can lead to in-
dividual liability. Similarly, mandatory reporting statutes in 
the context of abuse have become common. Individuals who fail 
to disclose evidence of abuse of children (or other vulnerable 
victims) can be criminally prosecuted or held liable in a civil ac-
tion.
65
  
Alternatively, enforcement authorities can try to provide 
affirmative benefits to those who decide to come forward. Per-
haps the most common form that this benefit takes is protec-
tion from third-party consequences, usually from an employer. 
Whistleblowers who provide information about corporate mis-
conduct are often protected from termination or other negative 
employment consequences as a result of the information they 
provide.
66
 In the securities industry, Sarbanes-Oxley provides 
this protection for those who provide information, enforced with 
both criminal and civil consequences for individuals who retali-
ate against whistle-blowers.
67
 The protection is common in oth-
er industries as well.
68
 
In addition to this incentive, enforcement agencies can 
provide benefits directly to individuals providing information. 
 
 63. See generally Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 903 (2011) (describing the use of cooperating criminal defendants by 
prosecutors). 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2014). 
 65. See generally Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The 
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for 
Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (2010) (outlining these and 
other examples). 
 66. Id. at 1161–63.  
 67. Id. at 1161. 
 68. Id. 
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In its simplest form, this benefit consists of monetary compen-
sation for information. Enforcement agencies can pay people to 
talk. The DOJ has statutory authorization to make such pay-
ments
69
 and frequently uses it. The Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration alone has thousands of informants on its payroll at 
any given time.
70
 Similar programs exist in the world of civil 
enforcement. For instance, starting in 2006, the Internal Reve-
nue Service can now pay informants up to thirty percent of the 
taxes collected as a result of the information provided.
71
  
Aside from money, enforcers can trade their discretion. 
Where individual charges are possible, the enforcement agency 
can reduce or eliminate the liability in exchange for the infor-
mation. This type of bargain is extremely common in criminal 
cases. The most formalized and best-documented structure oc-
curs in the federal system. Criminal cooperators plead guilty to 
a cooperation agreement and provide information to the prose-
cutors about the criminal conduct of others.
72
 In return, the 
government makes a motion to the district judge authorizing a 
reduction of the sentence
73
 below the level prescribed by the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines as well as below any oth-
erwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence. Such motions 
are made in a significant fraction of federal criminal prosecu-
tions and are particularly common in narcotics cases.
74
 In the 
corporate context, the DOJ considers cooperation in its decision 
about whether to charge the entity in addition to the individu-
als.
75
  
More informally, prosecutors can drop charges completely 
or never even initiate a case in exchange for information. In the 
corporate context, the DOJ operates a longstanding policy of 
immunity from antitrust prosecutions for the first entity to re-
 
 69. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 886(a) (2012). 
 70. U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., 
THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S PAYMENTS TO CONFIDENTIAL 
SOURCES (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a05/ 
final.pdf (“According to the DEA, it has approximately 4,000 active confiden-
tial sources at any one time.”). 
 71. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006). 
 72. See generally Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and 
Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2573 (2008) (describing the cooperation 
process). 
 73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 59, § 5K1.1. 
 74. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, tbl.5.36 (2010) (substantial assistance departures made 
in 11.5% of cases overall; 24.6% of drug trafficking cases). 
 75. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 43, at 9-28.700. 
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port a violation.
76
 This “first-in-the-door” rule allows the initial 
company providing information to escape charges entirely. Po-
lice themselves may never even bring the case to the attention 
of a prosecutor, releasing a suspect in the field as a result of ev-
idence provided at the time of arrest.
77
 Data on these more in-
formal arrangements are much more difficult to collect for ob-
vious reasons, but the information that is available suggests 
they are very common. Notably, the overwhelming majority of 
search warrant applications reflect a reliance on informant in-
formation.
78
 
Whether compensated in leniency or in money, informants 
are a high risk/high reward proposition for enforcement agen-
cies. On the benefit side, informants bring enormous value to 
the enforcement process.
79
 They allow high-level individuals to 
be targeted who have shielded themselves from other forms of 
incriminating evidence. Equally important, the simple prospect 
that coconspirators may eventually speak to law enforcement 
reduces trust in criminal organizations. As a result, the initial 
formation of agreements to violate the law becomes less likely.
80
  
However, cooperators also present real dangers. Recruiting 
the wrong cooperators or inadequately vetting their claims can 
produce disaster. Law enforcement runs the risk of both overly 
generous reductions for the cooperator and the possibility of re-
lying on false testimony.
81
 The second concern, of course, is the 
most significant danger that comes with the use of testimony of 
criminal witnesses promised leniency. Enforcement agencies 
always run the risk that a witness will derive the benefits of 
cooperation through perjured testimony.
82
 
 
 76. See SCOTT D. HAMMOND, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND 
MODEL LENIENCY LETTERS (NOVEMBER 19, 2008) at 5, available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239583.pdf. 
 77. See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal 
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 659 (2004). 
 78. Id. at 657. 
 79. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sen-
tencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (2012). See generally Baer, supra note 63, 
at 920–30. 
 80. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 79, at 59; see also Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1340 (2003). 
 81. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND 
THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 33, 70–76 (2009); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Co-
operation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embel-
lishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 952–53 (1999). 
 82. See NATAPOFF, supra note 81, at 70–72. 
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These risks are real, but can be minimized.
83
 Undetected 
perjury is more likely in some situations than others. For ex-
ample, jailhouse informants who claim to have had post-arrest 
conversations with the defendants pose a far greater risk of 
perjury than cooperators working undercover who are record-
ing conversations with potential targets.
84
 Similarly, a deep un-
derstanding of the value of corroboration as a mechanism of lie 
detection significantly reduces the dangers of cooperation 
agreements.
85
  
A generalist enforcement agency has the advantage of re-
peatedly handling cooperators, developing both the expertise in 
lie detection and the policy structures that help guide its use 
effectively. In contrast, specialized agencies are likely to use 
them far less often. This relative lack of experience increases 
the probability of bad outcomes when agencies do begin to rely 
on their information. 
In practice, cooperating witnesses were traditionally large-
ly unused by agencies. Unlike the DOJ, administrative agen-
cies generally do not have standard cooperation agreements, 
although some agencies do have whistleblower polices that pro-
vide greater or lesser degrees of protection for individuals 
providing information.
86
 As a result, administrative agencies 
historically likely missed out on the value of informant testi-
mony in building strong regulatory investigations. There is 
some evidence of agencies suffering in this respect. For exam-
ple, the SEC had multiple opportunities to detect the Madoff 
fraud at a much earlier stage based on information provided by 
a financial analyst who had determined that Madoff’s returns 
were impossible.
87
 The SEC struggled to handle the information 
in part because it came from an unusual or unexpected source.
88
 
Other agencies have had similar problems effectively integrat-
ing and taking advantage of this type of information.
89
  
 
 83. Baer, supra note 63, at 932, 941–42 (describing techniques that prose-
cutors use to reduce cooperator lies). 
 84. Id. at 942 (discussing the value of undercover work in corroborating a 
cooperator’s claim). 
 85. See Minzner, supra note 72, at 2572–73. 
 86. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (2012) (providing statutory protection 
for IRS whistleblowers).  
 87. For a short, readable account of the SEC handling of the whistleblow-
er information, see Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal, 
Three Narratives in Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 900. 
 88. See id. at 909–10. 
 89. See Mariano-Florention Cuéllar, The Institutional Logic of Preventive 
Crime, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 137 (describing 
FDA use of informants in tobacco investigations including reliance on the 
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More recently, agencies have begun to move in the direc-
tion of paying bounties to individuals that provide information 
that produces recoveries. The IRS has had a long-standing 
bounty program but dramatically expanded and reshaped it in 
2006.
90
 As part of the Dodd-Frank legislation, Congress author-
ized payments to whistleblowers and the SEC adopted imple-
menting regulations in 2011.
91
 The Center for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services, a branch of the Department of Health and 
Human Services, has proposed a similar bounty program that 
would make payments in cases involving health care fraud.
92
 To 
the extent that agencies are now beginning to rely on this type 
of information, they will face the opposite problem. They will 
run the risk of false testimony and (potentially) damaged inves-
tigations. 
Like the other aspects of enforcement discussed in this sec-
tion, the evaluation of information from informants and the 
creation of appropriate incentives have specialist and general-
ist elements. Doing these tasks well involves drawing on both 
industry-specific knowledge and generalist enforcement capaci-
ty. As a result, specialized enforcement comes with tradeoffs 
that must be managed.  
III.  SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT: STRUCTURAL 
WEAKNESSES & STRENGTHS   
Thus far, I have focused on the experiential tradeoff result-
ing from the choice between specialist and generalist enforce-
ment. This Part considers the consequences of the structural 
choice of specialized enforcement. I initially consider two 
weaknesses that arise when enforcement is specialized and 
fragmented. First, specialized enforcement varies in aggres-
siveness in response to shifts in public scrutiny. Because agen-
cy enforcement usually receives little attention, regulatory cap-
ture can lead specialized enforcers to be less aggressive than a 
generalist agency. However, after a catastrophe, specialist en-
forcers face pressure to do something, leading to more aggres-
 
skills of criminal investigators in handling informants). 
 90. See Franziska Hertel, Note, Qui Tam for Tax?: Lessons from the 
States, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1897, 1908–09 (2013) (describing the IRS pro-
gram).  
 91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012) (authorizing payments of awards to whis-
tleblowers); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1 to 240.21F-17 (2014) (implementing regu-
lations for whistleblower incentives and protections). 
 92. See Medicare Program; Requirements for the Medicare Incentive Re-
ward Program and Provider Enrollment, 78 Fed. Reg. 25013, 25016 (Apr. 29, 
2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 420, 424, and 498). 
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sive enforcement than a generalist agency. Second, agencies 
can only control their own enforcement program but regulated 
entities must consider the actions of all potential enforcers. 
This difference in focus between enforcer and target produces 
negative consequences for specialized enforcers. 
The last two Sections consider the corresponding structural 
benefits of specialized enforcement. Specialist enforcers have 
an advantage because they have access to the other tools of 
administrative regulation. Generalist enforcers are limited be-
cause their choice is restricted to individual, case-by-case deci-
sions to proceed with an enforcement action or refrain from 
charging. Agencies, though, bring a wide variety of other tools 
to the enforcement calculus—they can modify the substantive 
law, alter the enforcement process itself, and draw on other 
agency experts to implement enforcement injunctions and con-
sent decrees. Finally, specialist enforcers are better able to re-
spond and alter compliance norms that already exist in regu-
lated entities. Because agency enforcers are close to the 
regulated industry, norm discovery, evaluation, and alteration 
are all easier for specialists when compared to generalists. 
A. THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT 
Most of the time, agency enforcement occurs outside of the 
view of the public. The actions of most federal regulatory agen-
cies are invisible in ordinary times. Enforcement is no excep-
tion. However, two important groups are always paying atten-
tion to agency enforcement and can influence its direction. 
First, the community regulated by the agency keeps a close eye 
on agency enforcement at all times—they pay the penalties 
that the agency imposes. This regulated community can easily 
affect enforcement choices (or other agency decisions) through 
its influence over Congressional oversight, activity that falls 
under the broad label of regulatory capture. Second, the agency 
itself and its employees are always aware of the enforcement 
choices and naturally have influence on the direction of agency 
enforcement. At times of low public scrutiny, actions by these 
two groups can pressure agencies toward underenforcement. 
Capture has become recognized
93
 as one of the central im-
pediments to optimal policy regimes. The core insight of cap-
ture theory is a straightforward application of the principal-
 
 93. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Organiza-
tion of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284 (2006) (“Sometime 
in the middle of last century, ‘capture theory’ became the dominant paradigm 
of bureaucratic behavior.”).  
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agent problem. If the public is the principal, acting through the 
government as its agent, capture occurs when the agent stops 
seeking to serve the goals of the principal and instead pursues 
the ends of a third party.
94
 For administrative agencies, the key 
third parties are regulated entities—agencies get captured 
when they become controlled by those industries they regulate.  
All government structures can be threatened by capture 
but federal administrative agencies are particularly vulnera-
ble.
95
 They regulate highly organized sectors of the economy 
with deep pockets. As a result, regulated entities have the ca-
pacity to resist unfavorable agency actions both directly and 
indirectly. For example, regulated entities are well positioned 
to directly influence agency rulemaking both initially, at the 
point when they are written through the notice-and-comment 
process,
96
 and later, through court challenges to the rules that 
the agency adopts.
97
 Regulated entities can have at least as 
 
 94. For a recent overview of capture theory, see generally Daniel Carpen-
ter & David A. Moss, Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: 
SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1–22 (Daniel Carpenter 
& David A. Moss eds., 2012). Foundational articles on capture as a principal-
agent problem include Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures As Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON & 
ORG. 243 (1987), and Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role 
of Collusion in Organizations, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1986). 
 95. Barkow, supra note 13, at 22–23 (identifying features of agencies that 
make capture a particularly serious problem).  
 96. In the pre-Internet era, large entities that were repeat players with 
the agency consistently dominated the commenting process. See generally 
Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture, 55 DUKE L.J. 943, 949–952 (2006). More recently, some studies have not-
ed that in some individual rulemakings, the majority of comments filed come 
from the public. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory De-
mocracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 414 (2005); David C. Nixon et al., With 
Friends Like These: Rule-Making Comment Submissions to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 59, 64 (2002). How-
ever, a careful review by Professor Coglianese suggests that those rule-
makings appear to be outliers. Coglianese, supra, at 964. Of course, the vol-
ume of comments does not necessarily measure their impact. There is at least 
some empirical evidence, though, that comments play a significant role in 
shaping policy. See Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: 
The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 105 (2006); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan 
Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on 
the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 128 (2006).  
 97. Judicial review has traditionally been viewed as a central mechanism 
preventing agency capture, but more recent scholarship has called that as-
sumption into question. Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Re-
view on Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1717, 1726–29 (2012) (reviewing literature on the changing perception of 
the roles of courts in preventing agency capture). While the evidence is mixed, 
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much impact indirectly, through campaign donations and other 
forms of political influence over the Congressional committees 
that approve budgets, conduct hearings, and otherwise oversee 
agency activities.
98
  
The capture problem can appear in virtually any type of 
agency action. However, the particular difficulties that capture 
presents to the enforcement function of administrative agencies 
have only recently begun to receive significant academic atten-
tion.
99
 Applying general results about capture, though, suggests 
that capture is apt to be an especially serious problem with cer-
tain types of agency activities.  
First, capture concerns are greater when the costs of agen-
cy actions are localized but the benefits are spread widely. The 
theoretical literature on agency capture demonstrates that cap-
ture concerns are most severe when the public benefits from 
regulatory activity are diffuse while private costs are concen-
trated on a limited number of firms.
100
 Those firms have the in-
centive and the ability to coordinate their actions to resist the 
administrative action while the beneficiaries have neither the 
ability nor the desire to fight hard in support. 
Second, the risk of capture depends on agency scope: 
whether an agency regulates a single industry or a more di-
verse community of entities.
101
 Agencies regulating a narrow 
industry are at greater risk than agencies with broader portfo-
lios. The securities industry naturally has substantial influence 
over the SEC and the mining industry plays a substantial role 
in shaping the actions of the MSHA. However, agencies that 
regulate multiple industries avoid single-industry capture be-
cause the diverse constituencies do not all push in the same di-
 
litigation may further capture as much as restrain it. See id. at 1786–89. At 
the very least, industry participants are well-placed to play a key role in any 
court challenges either on offense or defense. 
 98. See generally, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the 
Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); 
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures As Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Barry R. Weingast & Wil-
liam J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress, 96 J. POL. ECON. 
132 (1988). 
 99. See Barkow, supra note 13, at 22; Lemos, supra note 11, at 717; Rose, 
supra note 12, at 2200. 
 100. See generally THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 367–70 (James Q. Wilson 
ed., 1980); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–3 (1965). 
 101. Jonathan Macey has called this issue the “most fundamental choice of 
agency design.” Macey, supra note 98, at 93; see also Barkow, supra note 13, at 
50.  
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rection.
102
  
Combining these two features suggests important results 
for specialist enforcement. First, even compared to other agen-
cy actions, the costs of enforcement actions are especially con-
centrated and the benefits especially diffuse. The consequences 
of enforcement fall on the target alone while the beneficiaries 
are the public at large. Similarly, the target of specialized en-
forcement will naturally come from the regulated community 
and will be able to exploit the vulnerability of the specialized 
agency. As a result, when the public is not paying much atten-
tion, specialist enforcement agencies face substantial pressure 
to undercharge, undersettle, and undercollect in enforcement 
actions.  
These pressures in times of limited public attention are re-
duced for generalist agencies. Agencies that just enforce and 
target entities in different industries may face the pressure of 
capture, but it is far more difficult to bring to bear. The lack of 
a concentrated industry to work through Congress protects 
generalist enforcement agencies. Moreover, generalist enforcers 
always receive some level of public scrutiny. The generalist en-
forcers at the state and federal level, Attorneys General and 
the Department of Justice, are frequently in the news.
103
 As a 
result, the pressure from regulated entities is far less likely to 
guide their enforcement programs. 
These dynamics reverse when attention turns to enforce-
ment. In ordinary times, capture is a problem producing down-
ward pressure on agency enforcement because of limited public 
attention. In extraordinary times, the opposite is true. Agency 
enforcement sometimes becomes highly visible. Following a 
dramatic enforcement failure, such as the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill
104
 or the Upper Big Branch mine collapse,
105
 the salience 
of enforcement changes. In those cases, historically invisible 
agencies like the Minerals Management Service or the MSHA, 
 
 102. See Macey, supra note 98, at 99.  
 103. See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforce-
ment, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 879 (2014) (noting that the Department of Jus-
tice and state Attorneys General, along with the SEC, are always in the public 
eye). 
 104. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE 
OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 87 (2011), available at http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO 
-OILCOMMISSION.pdf (describing the explosion and spill).  
 105. GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE 
APRIL 5, 2010 EXPLOSION: A FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES 
4 (2011), available at http://npr.org/documents/2011/may/giip-massey 
-report.pdf (describing the mine collapse). 
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receive substantial public scrutiny.
106
 Congressional attention 
follows public attention. Because the public becomes interested 
in enforcement, Congress does as well. Committee hearings in-
vestigating agency enforcement practices are a common re-
sponse to disasters.
107
  
This scrutiny reverses the pressure on enforcement at spe-
cialist agencies. While specialists are likely to underenforce 
compared to generalists during times of low visibility, the oppo-
site effect should occur during times of high visibility. External 
and internal forces will push specialist agencies in the direction 
of enforcement in times of high scrutiny. Indeed, that dynamic 
is frequently observed. Agencies become far more interested in 
building their reputation as aggressive enforcers in the wake of 
a serious tragedy. For example, many agencies promote their 
enforcement results in their Congressional budget requests.
108
 
However, while high-profile agencies like the SEC and the 
CFTC generally engage in this self-promotion in all circum-
stances, lower profile agencies only draw attention to their en-
forcement successes after a major disaster.
109
 Specialized agen-
cies care about appearing aggressive, but only when the public 
is focused on enforcement.
110
  
Similar effects happen even in high profile agencies. High 
profile events have frequently pushed the SEC to enforce in ar-
eas previously left untouched.
111
 The agency recently received 
substantial attention relating to its enforcement in the area of 
options backdating. In these cases, employees received stock 
options with the dates retroactively assigned to make them 
 
 106. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, supra note 104 at 68 (describing Minerals Management 
Service failings); GOVERNOR’S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, supra note 105, 
at 77 (describing critiques of the Mine Safety and Health Administration). 
 107. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Authorities Vow To Close Mines Found To Be 
Unsafe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2010, at A16 (describing Congressional hearings 
on the Mine Safety and Health Administration and the Big Branch mine col-
lapse); Susan Saulny, Finger-Pointing, but Few Answers at Hearings on Drill-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A14 (describing the Congressional hearings 
on the Deepwater Horizon disaster). 
 108. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 103, at 882–83. 
 109. Id. at 882. 
 110. Id. at 883 (“[A]gencies’ incentive to build reputations as strong enforc-
ers . . . is variable and depends on the level of public attention directed at the 
agencies’ enforcement programs.”).  
 111. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the 
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (2003); Stephen J. Choi et al., Scandal Enforce-
ment at the SEC: The Arc of the Option Backdating Investigations, 15 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 542, 546 (2013). 
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more valuable at the time they were granted.
112
 This area did 
not receive much press coverage until a flurry of stories was 
published in 2006. This surge of attention produced, predicta-
bly, a surge in enforcement actions.
113
 A recent empirical study, 
though, suggests that this was far from an optimal response, 
producing enforcement actions that were progressively weaker 
over time.
114
 These results suggest that the SEC, like all spe-
cialized agencies, is subject to political pressures that drive an 
overreaction to enforcement failures.
115
  
This combination of high and low public visibility of agency 
activities leads to a boom and bust cycle of enforcement for spe-
cialized agencies—agencies underenforce on a given issue most 
of the time, but can overreact after a significant catastrophe. 
Generalist enforcement agencies are not immune to these pres-
sures, of course. Scrutiny following an enforcement failure can 
induce a response at the DOJ as well. However, it is more 
shielded from these effects. At specialized agencies, the highs 
are higher and the lows are lower. The combination of capture 
and limited public scrutiny put more downward pressure on 
specialized enforcement. Similarly, when salience shifts, the 
upward response is greater. 
B. SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT AND THE SILO EFFECT 
In a world of specialized enforcement, overlapping jurisdic-
tion is inevitable.
116
 Multiple agencies frequently regulate the 
same entity. As a result, that entity reacts to the incentives 
created by multiple enforcement divisions. Nuclear power 
plants, for example, respond to several masters. The NRC ini-
tially licenses power plant activities and generally oversees 
their safe operation.
117
 However, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), with state and local authorities, regulates many 
of the environmental aspects of power plant operations.
118
 This 
 
 112. See Choi et al., supra note 111, at 543.  
 113. Id. at 546–47. 
 114. Id. at 575. 
 115. Id. at 546 (“The SEC’s response to option backdating suggests that it 
is not immune to the political imperative to ‘do something.’”). 
 116. See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in 
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 208 (“[S]tatutes that parcel out 
authority or jurisdiction to multiple agencies may be the norm, rather than an 
exception.”). 
 117. See generally Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facili-
ties, 10 C.F.R. § 50 (2014) (providing for NRC regulation of the construction 
and operation of power plants).  
 118. See generally Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nu-
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joint regulation means that the actions of any regulator can 
constrain the power plant’s activities. Consider the Oyster 
Creek Generating Station in New Jersey, the oldest nuclear 
power plant in the United States.
119
 In 2009, the NRC extended 
the plant’s license for an additional twenty years despite public 
opposition.
120
 However, Exelon, the owner of the plant an-
nounced in 2010 that the plant would be retired in 2019, ten 
years early, blaming environmental regulations enforced by the 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
121
 
Oyster Creek is simply one example of a general phenome-
non. Simultaneous regulation of the same entity is common. 
For example, entities in the energy industry often own nuclear 
plants regulated by the NRC and coal plants overseen by the 
EPA. If the company is public, the SEC will regulate its securi-
ties filing. Such entities have choices to make. Because compli-
ance budgets are not unlimited, companies need to decide 
where to focus their attention. Quite naturally, large penalties 
will get the most attention and the greatest efforts at compli-
ance. 
To the extent that specialized agencies set penalties opti-
mally, these efforts are desirable. When Enforcer A consistently 
imposes larger penalties than Enforcer B, those penalties 
might show that Enforcer A consistently identifies more serious 
violations. Nevertheless, we know that this tends not to be 
true. In Predictably Incoherent Judgments,
122
 Cass Sunstein, 
Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov demon-
strated that agency punishments are internally consistent but 
externally incoherent. Specialized agencies scale their penalties 
against other penalties for violations enforced by the same 
agency but not against penalties imposed by other regulators. 
Consider the penalties imposed by the Occupational Safety & 
Health Administration and those imposed by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service. The penalties for illegally importing wildlife 
 
clear Power Operations, 40 C.F.R. § 190 (2014) (outlining EPA regulation of 
radiation exposure from power plants). 
 119. The plant came online in 1969 operating under a forty-year license 
issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See Oyster Creek Generating 
Station, EXELON, http://www.exeloncorp.com/PowerPlants/oystercreek/Pages/ 
profile.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).  
 120. See Press Release, NRC Renews Operating License for Oyster Creek 
Nuclear Power Plant for an Additional 20 Years (April 8, 2009), available at 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0909/ML090980482.pdf.  
 121. See Matthew L. Wald, Oyster Creek Reactor To Be Closed by 2019, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010, at A44 (describing agreement to close plant). 
 122. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1153 (2002). 
2015] SHOULD AGENCIES ENFORCE? 2143 
 
are substantially larger than those imposed for serious work-
place safety violations.
123
 
As a result, the fact that large penalties draw significant 
compliance efforts can be distortionary. Regulated entities will 
focus their efforts on the agency imposing the largest penalties 
even when those penalties do not reflect the most serious viola-
tion. A generalist enforcement agency, of course, could end up 
with inconsistent penalties across the various violations it en-
forces, but the simple fact that a single body oversees the en-
forcement efforts reduces the problem. Because enforcement 
agencies do frequently scale penalties appropriately internally, 
the distortion is reduced.  
So far the analysis has assumed only that the regulated 
entity is identical. These problems are compounded when two 
enforcers can punish not only the same entity, but also the 
same conduct. Misconduct by a defendant does not necessarily 
stay neatly within the lines draw by statute. As a result, a sin-
gle violation might face charges from multiple enforcers. The 
enforcement actions might be contemporaneous. For example, 
simultaneous enforcement is common in securities cases, where 
the DOJ and the SEC pursue actions against a defendant at 
the same time.
124
 Alternatively, defendants might face sequen-
tial enforcement. In such cases, the resolution of an enforce-
ment action might produce collateral consequences outside the 
jurisdiction of the original enforcer. Certain administrative en-
forcement actions (such as a range of EPA Clean Water Act and 
Clean Air Act cases) can lead to debarment.
125
 Notably, viola-
tors are either temporarily or permanently precluded from en-
 
 123. Id. at 1190. 
 124. The Rajat Gupta insider trading case provides a recent example of the 
interaction between SEC and DOJ investigations. The SEC initially filed 
charges on its own against Gupta administratively in March of 2011 but then 
abandoned the case in August. See Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Drops Proceeding 
Against Rajat Gupta, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2011), http://dealbook 
.nytimes.com/2011/08/04s-e-c-drops-administrative-proceeding-against-gupta. 
It then recharged the case in district court once Gupta was indicted criminally. 
See SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Rajat Gupta, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/ 
2011-223.htm. Gupta was eventually convicted in June 2012. See Peter 
Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Ex-Goldman Director Convicted of Passing Secrets 
to Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1.   
 125. Criminal convictions lead to automatic debarment while the EPA has 
discretionary debarment authority for other forms of misconduct. See generally 
Justin M. Davidson, Comment, Polluting Without Consequence: How BP and 
Other Large Government Contractors Evade Suspension and Debarment for 
Environmental Crime and Misconduct, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 261–63 
(2011) (describing debarment authority).  
2144 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:2113 
 
tering into any federal contract, not just contracts with the 
agency imposing debarment.
126
 All federal agencies must en-
force the debarment order.  
Both sequential and simultaneous enforcement actions can 
cross other enforcement boundaries as well. State, federal and 
private enforcement often punish the same conduct.
127
 Securi-
ties class actions are often filed after SEC investigations.
128
 En-
forcement by other agencies produces similar outcomes.
129
  
Naturally, enforcement targets tend to be indifferent be-
tween the direct and collateral consequences of an enforcement 
action. A $10 million payment to the EPA that leads to the vio-
lator losing out on a series of federal procurement contracts 
worth $50 million over five years is likely to be less attractive 
than a one-time $25 million payment that does not lead to de-
barment. Enforcement targets will always see cases holistical-
ly, aggregating the direct and collateral costs in determining 
how to proceed.
130
  
In comparison, enforcement agencies cannot take a holistic 
approach. Almost by definition, only the direct consequences of 
an agency enforcement action are within its control. The collat-
eral consequences lie outside its jurisdiction. This mismatch be-
tween the defendant’s concerns and the agency’s capacities has 
a significant impact on settlement negotiations. Standard mod-
els of settlement recognize that parties in agency enforcement 
 
 126. See 2 C.F.R. § 180 (2014) (outlining procedures to enforce cross-agency 
debarment). 
 127. The $25 billion dollar settlement in February 2012 between states, the 
federal government and large banks providing mortgage services is simply one 
of many recent examples of joint federal-state enforcement actions. See Mar-
garet H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits By 
State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 526 (2012). States often also 
have authorization to enforce federal law directly, but generally cannot do so 
when a federal enforcement action is pending. See Lemos, supra note 11, at 
709. 
 128. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action 
Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utitlity of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 103, 156 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney 
General: Why the Model of the Lawyer As Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 
MD. L. REV. 215, 225 (1983).  
 129. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 128, at 131 (describing class ac-
tions after Federal Trade Commission enforcement activity). 
 130. Not surprisingly, members of the enforcement defense bar explicitly 
advise their clients to consider all of the collateral consequences when negoti-
ating an enforcement settlement. See Carmen Lawrence et al., Seeing Beyond 
the Deal: The Collateral Consequences of SEC Settlements, INV. LAWYER, Nov. 
2011, at 1, available at http://www.hb.betterregulation.com/external/Seeing% 
20Beyond%20the%20Deal%20The%20Collateral%20Consequences%20of%20S
EC%20Settlements.pdf. 
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actions will negotiate in light of the probability of a government 
victory at trial or hearing and the likely consequences of that 
victory.
131
 For example, assuming perfect information on both 
sides, if the parties place a seventy-five percent likelihood on a 
pro-government outcome at trial and expect an average $20 
million penalty to be imposed if the government wins, the case 
will likely settle earlier for about $15 million.  
Collateral consequences alter this calculus. If settlements 
and government trial victories both lead to follow-on enforce-
ment actions by others, a pretrial resolution may become im-
possible. As a general matter, agencies can, for example, in-
crease or decrease the settlement amount but cannot offer 
immunity from future civil suits. However, if the defendant los-
es at trial, issue preclusion may work to its detriment in later 
lawsuits.
132
 Similarly, admissions of wrongdoing in a settlement 
agreement may be admissible into evidence.
133
 In cases where 
the likely costs of future civil litigation are low, a reduction in 
the penalty may be sufficient to mitigate this collateral conse-
quence and induce a settlement. However, where the collateral 
consequences are severe, penalty reductions will not be enough. 
Even if the agency reduces the direct impact of the enforcement 
action to zero and imposes no penalty in the settlement, the 
threat of subsequent civil suits may prevent a resolution. Con-
sider the example above, where the parties expect a seventy-
five percent chance of a government win at trial leading to an 
average penalty of $20 million. If the future civil actions result-
ing from a settlement will cost the target only $5 million on av-
erage, the enforcement agency will be able to reduce the set-
tlement amount to $10 million and still induce the target to 
take the offer. If, however, the lawsuits resulting from settle-
ment will produce $500 million in average liability, even a set-
tlement offer of zero will be declined.
134
 The target will certainly 
 
 131. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is 
Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 495–96 (1996); George L. Priest & Benjamin 
Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 132. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330–31 (1979) 
(nonmutual issue preclusion after SEC enforcement action); Max Minzner, 
Saving Stare Decisis: Preclusion, Precedent, and Procedural Due Process, 2010 
BYU L. REV. 597, 598. 
 133. The Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as parallel state evidence 
codes, make such statements generally admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2). 
 134. At least in the enforcement context, it is common that the potential 
future consequences are far greater than the immediate penalty. See Gilles & 
Friedman, supra note 128, at 157–58 & n.204 (“The SEC, FTC, and DOJ all 
know that the real financial wallop, in most instances, will come from the pri-
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prefer to roll the dice and go to trial.
135
  
In theory, then, the existence of alternate enforcement ac-
tions might produce more trials. As a result, specialized enforc-
ers should settle less often than generalists. In practice, en-
forcement agencies work with targets to alter their settlement 
practices to reduce or eliminate these spillover effects. Settle-
ments are structured to reduce or eliminate the secondary ef-
fects that would occur after trial. These effects are easiest to 
see in the situations where the collateral consequences are 
greatest. For example, criminal defendants who are not United 
States citizens frequently care far more about the potential 
immigration consequences of their conviction than the prison 
sentence.
136
 As a result, plea negotiations for noncitizens often 
turn on whether the prosecutor and defense attorney can reach 
a resolution that involves a guilty plea only to offenses that do 
not lead to deportation.
137
 As a result, the specialization of en-
forcement, i.e. the separation between the criminal and immi-
gration enforcement functions, means that defendants plead 
guilty to different crimes than they would if a single generalist 
enforcer controlled both functions.
138
  
 
vate class actions that follow their investigations.”).   
 135. In reality, the calculation is more complicated than presented in this 
stylized example. For instance, civil suits are likely to occur whether or not the 
defendant settles with the agency and, as a result, the key question is the 
marginal impact of the settlement on the outcome of the civil case.  
 136. Especially for adult defendants who entered the country years earlier, 
the consequences of deportation and the resulting separation from home and 
family can matter far more than the length of incarceration. See Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (recognizing that deportation is “some-
times the most important part . . . of the penalty that may be imposed on 
noncitizen[s]”). 
 137. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Padilla presumes that 
the plea process will involve negotiating around these immigration conse-
quences. The Court held that defendants who are misinformed about immigra-
tion consequences may bring an ineffective assistance claim, noting that de-
fense counsel “may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in 
order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deporta-
tion, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the 
removal consequence.” Id. at 373. For an analysis of whether such negotiations 
are likely in practice, see Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter 
(Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1399 (2011).  
 138. Giving state prosecutors control over deportation consequences is both 
unrealistic and (perhaps) unconstitutional. However, even in federal criminal 
cases, criminal and immigration enforcement are separate. The Department of 
Justice, acting either directly or through a United States Attorney, negotiates 
the resolution of the criminal case and the Department of Homeland Security 
handles any later immigration consequences. Deportation is not an issue open 
to negotiation in the criminal case. See Agreements in Connection with Crimi-
nal Proceedings or Investigations, Promising Non-Deportation or Other Immi-
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The same phenomenon occurs in civil enforcement. The 
SEC has adjusted its enforcement approach to generate settle-
ments in cases where the potential collateral consequences 
might otherwise force cases to trial. Targets of SEC investiga-
tions are very frequently concerned about the possibility of civil 
lawsuits predicated on the same conduct at issue in the en-
forcement action. These lawsuits can lead to exposure far 
greater than the penalties imposed by the agency.
139
 In re-
sponse, the SEC (along with other agencies) adopted a long-
standing practice permitting enforcement targets not to admit 
liability when settling enforcement actions.
140
 Instead, settle-
ment agreements state that targets neither admit nor deny the 
allegations. The express purpose of this policy is to permit set-
tlements that, in theory, will not directly lead to exposure in 
private actions.
141
 While the lawsuit can still be filed, the set-
tlement itself will not be useful to the plaintiffs. If the SEC 
could extinguish private claims through the public investiga-
tion, this settlement policy would be unnecessary. Companies 
could admit liability without fear of future consequences. Here 
again the specialization of enforcement, i.e. the split between 
public and private, means that enforcement actions are re-
solved differently than they would in a universe with a general-
ist enforcer.  
These different outcomes have costs. Admissions of wrong-
doing have both intrinsic and extrinsic value. They bring clo-
sure, induce introspection and remorse in defendants, and 
bring procedural and legitimacy benefits to enforcement sys-
tems.
142
 Requiring an admission of liability helps prevent the 
conviction of the innocent by requiring defendants to describe 
 
gration Benefits, 28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (2014) (explaining that immigration offi-
cials are not bound by promises in plea agreements). 
 139. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Es-
say on Deterence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1542–43 
(2006); Gilles & Friedman, supra note 128, at 157–58.  
 140. Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public 
Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505 (2013) (describing SEC practice).  
 141. See Examining the Settlment Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112 Cong. 83 (2012) (testimony of 
Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ 
ts051712rk.htm (“The reality is that many companies likely would refuse to 
settle cases if they were required to affirmatively admit unlawful conduct or 
facts related to that conduct. This is because such admissions would not only 
expose them to additional lawsuits by private litigants seeking damages, but 
would also risk a ‘collateral estoppel’ effect in such lawsuits.”). 
 142. Buell, supra note 140, at 513 (describing these values served by ad-
missions). 
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under oath what they did.
143
 It also helps ensure public confi-
dence by avoiding an outcome in which defendants repeatedly 
deny conduct they are punished for.
144
 The SEC’s “neither admit 
nor deny” approach sacrifices these benefits. Similarly, it is not 
at all hard to imagine criminal defendants pleading guilty to a 
crime they did not commit to avoid the deportation consequenc-
es of their actual offense.
145
  
These costs will occur in every enforcement structure 
where a single agency does not control all of the consequences 
of an enforcement action. Following Dodd-Frank, the SEC im-
posed new reporting requirements on publicly traded compa-
nies that operate mines.
146
 Starting in 2012, these companies 
were required to disclose certain categories of MSHA sanctions 
to investors.
147
 It is too soon to see the impact of this require-
ment. However, assuming mining companies expect these dis-
closures to have a significant negative impact on stock prices, 
this SEC requirement will alter the MSHA penalty negotiation 
process. The MSHA cannot exempt mining companies from the 
SEC obligation but it can, in theory, structure settlements to 
avoid the triggering conditions. 
These costs may be worth paying. As discussed in the next 
Part, there is value in specialization in enforcement as well. 
There are strong arguments for not placing the obligation to en-
force securities regulation and mine safety in the same agency. 
Additionally, permitting public enforcers to directly preclude 
private lawsuits creates serious implementation problems.
148
 
 
 143. The central purpose of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which 
requires the court to determine that there is a factual basis for a guilty plea, is 
to prevent pleas by innocent defendants. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory 
committee’s note. This requirement is frequently met by requiring a defendant 
to testify to the facts necessary to make out the elements of the crime. Buell, 
supra note 140, at 508–09.   
 144. Id. at 513. 
 145. It is widely understood that innocent defendants may have the incen-
tive to plead guilty if the costs of going to trial are sufficiently high. See, e.g., 
Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1120 & n.5 
(2008) (citing additional sources).   
 146. See Mine Safety Disclosure, Exchange Act Releases Nos. 33-9286, 34-
66019 (Jan. 27, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33 
-9286.pdf (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229).  
 147. Id. 
 148. Unlike many other agencies, EPA enforcement actions can be barred 
by state enforcement actions and either state or EPA enforcement can pre-
clude private causes of action. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in 
Statutory Preclusions Against Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions 
by EPA Citizens Part One: Statutory Bars in Citzen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 403 (2004). This structure has created complicated prob-
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This analysis simply identifies a new cost of fragmented en-
forcement in a world of collateral consequences. Unlike a spe-
cialist agency, a generalist enforcer can directly offer holistic 
resolution of all of the potential consequences of the defendant’s 
conduct. Specialized enforcers will always be forced to modify 
their enforcement practices in potentially costly ways to 
achieve a similar result.  
C. SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT AND AGENCY ALTERNATIVES  
The previous two Sections have explored the structural 
weaknesses that come from placing enforcement authority in a 
single, specialized agency. Specialized agencies, of course, have 
countervailing strengths that in many cases make up for these 
weaknesses. In particular, specialist enforcement occurs in an 
agency staffed by subject matter experts that also possesses 
other regulatory powers. At each stage of the enforcement pro-
cess, the agency can use its industry knowledge or structural 
flexibility to improve, augment, or substitute for a typical en-
forcement action.  
Consider first the decision to bring an enforcement action 
in the first place. A generalist enforcer confronted with miscon-
duct has essentially two options. It can charge conduct and 
seek a penalty or it can decline to prosecute. Of course, an en-
forcement action might take one of many forms. For example, 
the DOJ initially proceeded against some medical marijuana 
facilities civilly, seeking an injunction against their ongoing op-
eration, rather than indicting the corporation or the individu-
als.
149
 By its very nature, though, an agency that just enforces 
has no other options—it can enforce or not, but it can do noth-
ing else. 
Specialist agencies, though, have options. Agencies that 
decide not to enforce need not sit on their hands entirely. Most 
importantly, most agencies can proceed by rulemaking. Agen-
cies do not have to respond to misconduct by regulated entities 
by seeking sanctions or imposing an order on an individual 
market participant. Instead, the agency can promulgate a 
broadly applicable rule that binds everyone. This ability to pro-
ceed by adjudication or rulemaking is a core structural feature 
of the modern administrative agency and the discretionary na-
 
lems of interpretation and implementation. See Matthew D. Zinn, Policing 
Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen 
Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 154 (2002).  
 149. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483 
(2001) (upholding such injunctive relief). 
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ture of the decision is central to administrative law.
150
  
This flexibility provides specialized agencies a particular 
advantage in the context of the decision not to enforce. Agen-
cies that do not want to punish particular actions can com-
municate that decision in a legally binding manner. They can 
alter the substantive law and commit themselves to the non-
enforcement choice. By issuing a rule clarifying that certain 
types of behavior are permissible, the agency will be legally 
bound to follow that rule unless and until the regulation is 
changed. 
Generalist enforcers certainly use nonenforcement as a tool 
as well. For example, the Obama Administration recently an-
nounced several areas of both civil and criminal law where it 
will not enforce statutory provisions. The DOJ has indicated 
that it will not bring certain categories of marijuana prosecu-
tions in states that have legalized the drug
151
 and will use its 
non-enforcement authority to delay the implementation of pro-
visions of the Affordable Care Act.
152
 Policy-based 
nonenforcement is bipartisan and occurred under the Bush 
Administration as well.
153
  
However, unlike specialized agencies with rule-making 
power, a generalist enforcer cannot commit to a position. 
Whenever the DOJ issues enforcement guidance, it is non-
binding. The DOJ lacks rule-making power and is free to aban-
don its commitment not to prosecute certain categories of cas-
es.
154
 This inability to bind can be a serious weakness. When 
public actors cannot credibly commit to a course of conduct, 
 
 150. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) 
(“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad 
hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the ad-
ministrative agency.”).  
 151. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to all 
U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 13, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/30520138291327568574 
67.pdf. 
 152. See Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, to Insurance Commissioners 
(Nov. 14, 2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Letters/ 
Downloads/commissioner-letter-11-14-2013.pdf. These examples are drawn 
from Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. 
L. REV. 671, 673 (2014). 
 153. Price, supra note 152, at 674; Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation 
Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795, 807–816 (2010) (providing 
examples from the Bush Administration). 
 154. See Joseph Stiglitz, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Govern-
ment: The Private Uses of Public Interest: Incentives and Institutions, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Spring 1998, at 9–10. 
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they are unable to use policy to shape behavior past the imme-
diate present.
155
 If an agency wants to use nonenforcement to 
alter conduct in the industry it regulates, it needs to commit to 
it as a policy. Because generalist agencies cannot do this credi-
bly, they will always be at a disadvantage in this realm com-
pared to specialized agencies.  
Not only can agencies modify the substantive law, they can 
adjust the enforcement process itself. Consider the example of 
restitution. Providing restitution for victims of misconduct is 
certainly an important goal of an enforcement process. Resolv-
ing restitution claims as part of the enforcement action serves 
independent enforcement values such as remorse and contri-
tion.
156
 More prosaically, it ensures that the public enforcement 
action does not render a defendant judgment-proof in the face 
of pending restitution claims.
157
  
Despite these benefits, restitution fits uneasily into the 
structure of public enforcement and presents both theoretical 
and practical challenges. A victim may hope that a public en-
forcement lawyer will seek to represent his or her interests ad-
equately, but victims have no guarantee that the restitution 
claims will be resolved to their satisfaction. A fundamental 
tenant of public enforcement is that the state, not the victim, is 
the prosecuting party. From the violator’s standpoint, a restitu-
tion order cannot provide one of the central goals of any de-
fendant—a final resolution of the claims that bars relitigation 
over the same injury. Because the victim is not a party, res ju-
dicata does not preclude a future lawsuit.
158
 
These problems are significant in cases involving a single 
defendant and a single victim, but are amplified when an inju-
ry is caused by multiple actors or falls on multiple victims. The 
former problem rose to the level of the Supreme Court in 
Paroline v. United States.
159
 Paroline considers the scope of res-
 
 155. See, e.g., id. (describing the problems arising from the inability of the 
government to make credible commitments). 
 156. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse 
and Apology Into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 89–90 (2004) (describ-
ing value of the remorse and apology in the criminal process). 
 157. For example, in federal prosecutions, the court cannot impose a fine 
that would reduce the funds available for restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b) 
(2012) (“[T]he court shall impose a fine or other monetary penalty only to the 
extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the ability of the defendant to 
make restitution.”). 
 158. While the restitution order is not preclusive in its own right, the fed-
eral restitution system provides that restitution amounts can be adjusted to 
reflect any later recovery of compensatory damages. See id. § 3664(j)(2). 
 159. 134 S. Ct. 1710 (2014) (holding restitution was proper to the extent 
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titution orders in child pornography cases. Can child victims 
recover for all injuries from any defendant? Or does the federal 
statute authorizing restitution in these cases limit the recovery 
from each individual defendant to his or her proportional con-
tribution to the harm?
160
  
While the question in Paroline turns on a question of stat-
utory interpretation, the core complication is the product of 
generalist enforcement. Whatever the appropriate structure of 
restitution, reaching the outcome in criminal litigation with a 
generalist agency will be difficult, if not impossible. The opti-
mal resolution in cases like Paroline is a binding order to pay 
restitution (in some amount) directed at all of those responsible 
for the creation and distribution of the child pornography. En-
forcement actions, though, only reach identified violations by 
known violators. The DOJ lacks the capacity to initiate an ac-
tion joining the appropriate defendants in a single simultane-
ous action that can produce a binding restitution order. Be-
cause all it does is enforce, the optimal outcome is beyond the 
reach of the generalist agency. 
The problem of multiple victims raises similar issues. Ad-
ministrative agencies now frequently attempt to generate pools 
of money as part of enforcement process in order to compensate 
victims. While this practice has a significant historical pedi-
gree,
161
 it has taken on particular importance in the last decade. 
The funds generated by agencies have grown dramatically in 
size.
162
 These funds, of course, mirror class actions in both their 
goals and their overall structure. Class actions, though, come 
with strong procedural protections to ensure representation of 
the interests of absent plaintiffs.
163
 Agency restitution funds 
 
that the defendant’s particular offense proximately caused the victim’s losses).  
 160. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (“The order of restitution under this section 
shall direct the defendant to pay the victim (through the appropriate court 
mechanism) the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the 
court.”). 
 161. Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 
518–21 (2011) (describing the history of agency restitution efforts). 
 162. Id. at 527 (estimating that three agencies alone collected $10 billion in 
restitution between 2001 and 2011); see also Urska Velikonja, Public Compen-
sation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, 67 
STAN. L. REV. 331, 350–59 (2014) (describing the extensive nature of the com-
pensation provided by the SEC fair funds distributions).  
 163. For example, courts must investigate the adequacy of the named 
plaintiffs to represent the class, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), and review and approve 
any settlement before it is implemented to ensure that “it is fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
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frequently lack these structural protections.
164
 From the de-
fendant’s perspective, the preclusive consequences of these 
funds are unclear. While agencies can require victims to waive 
the right to sue if they decide to collect from the restitution 
fund,
165
 absent such a waiver, defendants may be subject to 
double recovery.
166
  
Both types of restitution efforts are essential to effective 
enforcement regimes. A specialist agency with rule-making 
power is far better situated to handle these efforts than a gen-
eralist “enforcement-only” agency. Rule-making is a key tool in 
making these restitution efforts effective. Because the rule-
making process that can bind stakeholders beyond the defend-
ant immediately involved in the enforcement action, it provides 
administrative agencies the capacity to reach far superior reso-
lutions in restitution actions. For absent victims, an agency can 
provide the procedural protections necessary to ensure a fair 
and adequate outcome.
167
 For absent violators, the agency can 
impose restitution obligations even if they are unknown. Be-
cause a generalist enforcement agency cannot augment the en-
forcement process in this way, restitution will always be more 
complex.
168
 
Finally, agencies can draw on their specialized knowledge 
at the end of the enforcement process and beyond. Financial 
penalties are a common outcome of public enforcement. Howev-
er, they are not the only possibility. Both administrative agen-
cies and the DOJ frequently seek and obtain remedies that are 
injunctive in nature either in lieu of or in addition to financial 
penalties.
169
 Along with injunctive relief imposed involuntarily 
after litigation, entities frequently agree to implement reforms 
when they settle enforcement actions. In 1982, such a consent 
decree resolved the antitrust litigation brought by the DOJ 
 
 164. Zimmerman, supra note 161, at 546–47 (criticizing agency funds for 
these weaknesses); see also Lemos, supra note 127, at 511 (discussing similar 
issues in actions brought by state attorneys general). 
 165. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980) (authorizing such 
waivers). 
 166. Zimmerman, supra note 161, at 544 (“[C]ourts lack criteria for evalu-
ating the preclusive effect, if any, of a large agency settlement.”).  
 167. Id. at 563–68 (arguing for negotiated rulemaking as a mechanism to 
reach the appropriate outcome). 
 168. Of course, the fact that a specialized agency can take these steps does 
not make it inevitable that it will do so. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 
161, at 539–53 (identifying the weaknesses in agency settlement funds in 
practice). 
 169. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 103, at 898–99 (discussing the 
choice between penalties and injunctive remedies).  
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against AT&T and required the divestiture of the business op-
erations providing local telephone service.
170
 More recently, the 
DOJ resolved antitrust claims against Microsoft using a com-
parable consent decree.
171
 Similar outcomes are a common reso-
lution of agency enforcement actions as well.
172
 
Ensuring compliance with consent decrees is well under-
stood to be very difficult.
173
 While the court and the plaintiff 
have a role in overseeing the efforts to comply, both are rela-
tively poorly situated to monitor the behavior of the target of 
the consent decree and identify violations. Even under the best 
of circumstances, outsiders will struggle to understand the be-
havior occurring within the firm. Judges and enforcers often 
lack both the time and the technical expertise to become famil-
iar enough with the enterprise to effectively enforce consent de-
crees in a timely fashion.
174
  
As significant as these problems can be when the case is 
resolved by a court-ordered consent decree, they are exacerbat-
ed when the resolution occurs without court supervision. One of 
the most significant recent changes in corporate criminal pros-
ecutions at the federal level has been the rise in the use of de-
ferred prosecution agreements. Rather than indict a company, 
federal prosecutors now routinely extract agreements from the 
entity to engage in structural reform to ensure future compli-
ance.
175
 Similar in practice to a consent decree, these contractu-
 
 170. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (approving 
consent decree). 
 171. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 
2002) (approving consent decree). These cases are not unusual. Consent de-
crees end the substantial majority of antitrust actions. See Jed Goldfarb, Note, 
Keeping Rufo in Its Cell: The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After 
Rufo v. Inmates Of Suffolk County Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 662 n.224 
(1997) (collecting data on frequency of antitrust consent decrees). 
 172. See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate 
Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714–20 (2007). 
 173. See, e.g., Eric A. Rosand, Consent Decrees in Welfare Litigation: Obsta-
cles to Compliance, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 123–34 (1994) (provid-
ing case studies on the difficulties of compliance). 
 174. “[M]onitoring compliance with long-term injunctions or consent de-
crees . . . can be a full-time job for the court.” Shira Scheindlin, We Need Help: 
The Increasing Use of Special Masters in Federal Court, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 
479, 482 (2009).  
 175. See generally Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Board-
room: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion To Impose Structural Reforms, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 62, 64–76; Richard A. 
Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 
36, at 38, 38–39 (comparing deferred prosecution agreements to other coercive 
litigation). 
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al agreements provide the government the ability to reshape 
and alter the conduct of the entity in exchange for the promise 
not to bring charges.  
These mechanisms to resolve enforcement actions have 
tremendous value, but are a clear example where specialized 
enforcement agencies are likely to excel when compared to a 
generalist enforcer. Ensuring compliance requires detailed 
knowledge specific to a particular firm and industry. An admin-
istrative agency has the non-lawyer technical staff with the ex-
pertise to conduct these tasks. Moreover, enforcing these 
agreements is quite similar to traditional agency regulation 
through rulemaking but is very different from the actions that 
lie at the core competency of a generalist enforcer.  
In the eyes of some scholars, the weaknesses of a generalist 
enforcer in setting up structural reforms are so great that these 
types of agreements should be restricted solely to the use of civ-
il regulators.
176
 Certainly the use of these agreements has re-
vealed some serious weaknesses in the approach of generalist 
enforcers. For example, one common mechanism to ensure con-
sent decrees are enforced appropriately is the appointment of a 
monitor with both the time and expertise to oversee compli-
ance.
177
 However, the DOJ routinely puts in place enforcers who 
are not industry experts but are often lawyers.
178
 As discussed 
in the next Section, consultation between regulatory agencies 
and generalist enforcers can alleviate some of these problems. 
In practice, the extent of the consultation is an open question.
179
  
 
 176. Arlen, supra note 175, at 81 (“[F]ederal civil regulators with authority 
over the firm generally are in the best position to determine both whether to 
impose any structural reform on a firm and, if so, which reforms should be im-
posed.”). 
 177. Griffin, supra note 36, at 119 (“About half of all DPAs also include 
monitoring provisions that effectively install government representatives 
within corporations to review and evaluate internal controls.”). Monitors are 
also used in the civil regulatory context. See Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 
172, at 1722 (“[U]sing monitors is not isolated to one particular area of regula-
tion but rather seems to be used with increasing frequency in a number of ar-
eas. Thus, the SEC, the DOJ, the IRS, and others have all used monitors.”); 
Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Ac-
tions, 1 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89, 94–102 (2006) (describing the 
role of the court-appointed corporate monitor in the SEC enforcement action 
against WorldCom).  
 178. Griffin, supra note 36, at 120 (“In practice, however, many monitors 
are former prosecutors, regulators, or retired judges. . . . Of the forty monitors 
appointed since 2000, thirty are former government officials.”). 
 179. Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor As Regulatory Agency, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 177, 179–97 (describing 
the effectiveness of consultation with regulators in both state and federal 
prosecutions).  
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Whether these critics are right, both the theory and the 
practice suggest that monitoring and implementing these types 
of agreements are likely to be done better by a specialized en-
forcer. Either as a deferred prosecution agreement without 
court involvement, or as a consent decree with judicial over-
sight, specialists have the expertise and the capacity to make 
these arrangements work. Generalist enforcers, in turn, are 
more likely to struggle. 
D. SPECIALIZED ENFORCEMENT AND NORMS OF BEHAVIOR 
Specialized agencies bring another significant advantage to 
the enforcement process. Enforcement lawyers are closer to the 
agency’s industry experts. In generalist enforcement agencies, 
lawyers live with lawyers. In specialist agencies, lawyers live 
with other people: economists, engineers, and scientists. Agen-
cies are largely staffed with non-lawyer subject matter experts. 
Not only do agency enforcement lawyers work closely with the-
se non-lawyers, they work closely with industry participants as 
well. In regulatory agencies, the move from government to in-
dustry (and back) is common and well known. Enforcement 
lawyers are frequently closely acquainted with those on the 
other side of the revolving door.
180
 
This close contact with both government-side and industry 
experts has important implications for one of the key tasks of 
an enforcement agency: responding to the compliance norms 
that exist within an industry. Standard theories of criminal law 
compliance, such as those discussed in Part II, assume that 
compliance is purely instrumental. Compliance occurs as the 
result of the threat of punishment.
181
 However, enforcement 
scholars have now broadly accepted the notion that social 
norms play a key role in producing compliance with legal 
rules.
182
 Simple notions of deterrence do not solely explain why 
actors follow the law. While some comply out of fear of punish-
ment, many others follow the rules out of a sense that it is the 
right thing to do.
183
 
Enforcers need to respond to these compliance norms both 
 
 180. See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 507, 547. 
 181. See Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1193–94 (2004). 
 182. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–7 (1990); Paul H. 
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468 
(1997). 
 183. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 20–27 (1992). 
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substantively and procedurally. On the substantive side, en-
forcement actions focused on conduct that violates industry 
norms can reinforce the norm and use the existence of the norm 
to achieve compliance easily.
184
 In contrast, actions that punish 
conduct that technically violates the law but is broadly viewed 
as acceptable can undermine the legitimacy of both the enforcer 
and the norm itself.
185
 While the norms themselves shape the 
conduct, the actions of the enforcer can either reinforce or un-
dermine them.  
Similarly, this literature suggests that how the enforcer 
conducts actions procedurally matters a great deal in reinforc-
ing norms and achieving compliance.
186
 Regardless of the sub-
stantive outcome, the response to the enforcement action de-
pends to a large degree on how the action is handled 
procedurally.
187
 Enforcers who are seen as consistently treating 
targets fairly, with respect and without bias, build a reputation 
for legitimacy.
188
 Legitimacy, in turn, is a key determinant in 
whether enforcement actions generate compliance.
189
 Enforce-
ment activity perceived as handled fairly builds the reputation 
of the enforcer and produces compliance norms while the oppo-
site is true for actions that are seen as unfair and illegitimate. 
As a result, enforcers need to identify the norms that exist 
in the communities they regulate, decide the quality of those 
norms, and select appropriate mechanisms to modify them. At 
each stage in this process—norm discovery, evaluation, and al-
teration—specialist agencies have an advantage. First, they are 
better able to learn and understand the norms that are current-
ly in place. Especially in complex regulatory environments, 
generalist lawyers may struggle to understand the behavioral 
norms that govern conduct. Industry experts are the ones best 
able to figure out the norms that exist. Indeed, the DOJ has 
recognized that it is likely to need help in this area. The United 
 
 184. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
186–87 (2008). 
 185. See id. 
 186. See Meares et al., supra note 181, at 1194–95 (describing this litera-
ture). Of course, this literature emphasizes the response of individuals, not 
firms, to norm creation and adjustment. However, even when regulations are 
aimed at firms, individuals make the ultimate compliance decisions.  
 187. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in 
Groups, 25 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 160–62 (1992). 
 188. Id. at 162. 
 189. See Meares, supra note 181, at 1195 (“Empirical work is quite persua-
sive that these legitimacy factors matter more to compliance than instrumen-
tal factors, such as sanctions imposed by authorities on individuals who fail to 
follow the law or private rules.”). 
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States Attorneys’ Manual encourages prosecutors to consult 
with industry experts in determining the adequacy of corporate 
compliance policies.
190
 Specialized regulatory agencies already 
have these experts in the building.  
Second, specialists are better able to determine when the 
norms that are in place are inadequate.
191
 A norm of noncom-
pliance can be incredibly destructive to a system of enforce-
ment. Tax enforcement, for example, becomes extremely diffi-
cult in a system where a significant fraction of taxpayers do not 
comply voluntarily.
192
 In the context of safety enforcement, lax 
industry norms may permit dangerous conduct to continue. 
However, a lack of compliance with a rule might suggest some-
thing quite different—the regulatory requirement might be in-
adequate and misguided and the industry norm may produce a 
safer or more appropriate outcome. Enforcement lawyers need 
to be able to distinguish between situations where risky con-
duct is considered acceptable and adjust norms to prevent it 
and, in turn, those situations where the norm is correct and the 
regulation should be changed.  
Finally, once norms are identified and determined to be in-
adequate, specialized agencies are better positioned to respond. 
Punishment for noncompliance is, of course, one mechanism to 
achieve this end and reinforce norms of compliance.
193
 As dis-
cussed in the previous section, for a generalist enforcer, pun-
ishment is the primary, if not exclusive, tool. Administrative 
agencies, can take a more flexible approach, though, to alter 
norms. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has a 
complicated and nuanced enforcement process.
194
 NRC actions 
involve a multi-step process where the agency gathers input in 
public forums from industry participants, including the target. 
 
 190. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 43, 9-28.800 
(“Many corporations operate in complex regulatory environments outside the 
normal experience of criminal prosecutors. Accordingly, prosecutors should 
consult with relevant federal and state agencies with the expertise to evaluate 
the adequacy of a program’s design and implementation.”). 
 191. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. Pa. 
L. REV. 1697, 1705 (1996) (noting the possible danger of incorrect or inefficient 
norms).  
 192. Leandra Lederman & Ted Sichelman, Enforcement As Substance in 
Tax Compliance, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1679, 1740 (2013); Dan M. Kahan, 
The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
71, 81 (2003). 
 193. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 182, at 470. 
 194. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NRC ENFORCEMENT POLICY 24–
26 (2011), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0934/ML093480037 
.pdf. 
2015] SHOULD AGENCIES ENFORCE? 2159 
 
In addition, it frequently involves case resolutions that impose 
alternative sanctions, such as naming particular employees as 
engaged in misconduct even if no punishment is imposed. This 
process has value in altering industry compliance norms. It is 
an option for a specialist agency dedicated for a specific indus-
try but is essentially unavailable to a generalist agency that 
simply focuses on enforcement. 
IV.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ENFORCEMENT 
TRADEOFF   
I have sought to demonstrate that we cannot assume that 
agencies will enforce well solely because they are experts in 
their regulatory domains. Because enforcement itself is an ex-
pertise that requires both general and specific knowledge, spe-
cialized agencies may be better or worse at enforcement com-
pared to a generalist enforcer. In addition, the decision to lodge 
enforcement authority in a specialized agency has structural 
consequences, which can be either positive or negative.  
How should institutional actors—Congressional, judicial, 
and administrative—respond to these tradeoffs? I argue that 
they attempt to maximize the strengths of specialized enforce-
ment while reducing its weaknesses. At the initial stage, when 
Congress establishes an agency, the decision to grant enforce-
ment authority should not follow automatically as a matter of 
course. For certain types of violations, federal enforcement au-
thority should live in a generalist agency. Moreover, when Con-
gress creates an agency with enforcement authority, that agen-
cy should specialize only to the point where the benefits 
outweigh the costs, but no further. 
The judiciary, in turn, should avoid assuming that all en-
forcement choices should receive identical deference. Agencies 
vary in their enforcement capacity and judicial deference across 
the enforcement choices of agencies should vary as well. Simi-
larly, within a given agency, different decisions that now are 
labeled “enforcement” should be treated differently. Decisions 
that are closely tied to the agency expertise and regulatory 
mission should receive significant deference, while those that 
are more generalist enforcement choices should receive less.  
Enforcement agencies themselves should also recognize 
their relative strengths and weaknesses in making choices 
about collaboration and coordination. Different enforcement 
agencies can work together to use the advantages of one agency 
to compensate for the shortcomings of others. While this type of 
coordination now frequently happens on the level of individual 
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cases, agencies need to take the next step and coordinate on the 
policy level as well.  
A. CONSEQUENCES FOR CONGRESS: STRUCTURING AGENCIES 
For Congress, the relative value of generalist and specialist 
enforcement needs to be considered when agencies are initially 
established. Enforcement authority should be specialized to the 
extent that the value of expertise in the subject matter over-
comes the loss of general enforcement knowledge, but no fur-
ther. 
Where enforcement tasks are truly subject matter specific, 
industry expertise may overshadow enforcement expertise. The 
NRC’s enforcement of engineering safety standards in the nu-
clear industry is intimately intertwined with the agency’s regu-
latory policy choices. The agency draws heavily on internal ex-
perts with a deep knowledge of nuclear power plant 
operations.
195
 In addition, the types of violations that occur in 
the industry are fundamentally different than those pursued in 
other enforcement environments.
196
 Placing enforcement of the-
se standards in a generalist enforcement agency would almost 
certainly be a mistake. However, even in this case, specializa-
tion has its costs. NRC enforcement has struggled with its 
treatment of whistleblowers
197
 and with the level of influence 
exercised by regulated entities over the enforcement process.
198
 
As discussed above, these are predictable consequences of en-
forcement specialization.
199
  
In contrast, though, other agencies enforce similar stand-
ards in closely related industries. Take, for example, the en-
forcement arms of the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trad-
 
 195. The investigation leading to the Oyster Creek renewal discussed in 
the previous section shows the extent of NRC reliance on staff experts. The 
agency considered a broad range of submissions including a nearly 900 page 
safety report on the operation of the plant, drawing on a wide range of staff 
experts. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, SAFETY EVALUATION 
REPORT (2006), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0623/ 
ML062300330.pdf. 
 196. Nuclear power plants are a common example of a “tightly coupled” 
system where a series of small failures can interact in surprising and unex-
pected ways, producing catastrophic results. See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL 
ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH RISK TECHNOLOGIES 32–61 (1999) (using pow-
er plant operations as a case study of this type of system). 
 197. CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR 
VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 160–
63 (2007) (discussing NRC treatment of whistleblowers). 
 198. Id. at 168–70 (discussing capture of the enforcement function). 
 199. See supra Parts II.C and III.A.  
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ing Commission. The SEC enforces statutes that are designed 
to ensure fairness in the securities markets and prevent 
fraud.
200
 The CFTC enforces similar statutes aimed at regulat-
ing the commodities markets and preventing fraud.
201
 These en-
forcement missions have similar legal foundations and are de-
signed to serve similar purposes in protecting the markets and 
participants.
202
  
Moreover, these markets are similar to each other but dif-
ferent from others. Both agencies essentially regulate the same 
types of transactions.
203
 For example, the types of fraud that oc-
cur in the marketing of commodities and securities often look 
similar. In both markets, customers can be deceived by false 
claims about the future value (or the simple existence) of the 
product. However, enforcement in both markets exists within a 
complex regulatory scheme. SEC and CFTC enforcement ac-
tions frequently rely heavily on similar expert testimony, espe-
cially from economists, drawn from other portions of the agen-
cy.
204
  
While there are differences in the securities and commodi-
ties markets, the differences probably do not justify dividing 
these enforcement tasks across these agencies. As a result, this 
Article provides additional support for a commonly proposed 
merger—joining together financial regulatory agencies.
205
 Merg-
ing the SEC and the CFTC has been frequently suggested
206
 
 
 200. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012). 
 201. See Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f (2012). 
 202. The similarity between the agencies’ goals is apparent in their mission 
statements. Compare The Investor’s Advocate, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (June 10, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (mis-
sion is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 
facilitate capital formation”), with CFTC Mission Statement, U.S. COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/reports/strategicplan/ 
2015/2015strategicplan01.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2015) (describing its mis-
sion, which is to “protect market users and the public from fraud, manipula-
tion, abusive practices and systemic risk related to derivatives that are subject 
to the Commodity Exchange Act, and to foster open, competitive, and finan-
cially sound markets”). 
 203. See Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions 
During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2011) 
(“The differences between [the SEC’s and CFTC’s] subject areas are merely 
historical; in essence, both agencies regulate securities trading.”). 
 204. See Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform De-
bate, 38 J. CORP. L. 325, 374 (2013) (noting use of agency experts, including 
economists, to supplement enforcement expertise). 
 205. See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regu-
lation, 101 CAL. L. REV. 327, 365 (2013) (discussing domestic and international 
merger proposals). 
 206. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of 
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and reached the point of a formal proposal by the Department 
of the Treasury.
207
 The analysis above suggests that the en-
forcement consequences of the merger could be quite beneficial.  
Revising the structure of existing agencies is a difficult 
task,
208
 of course, but the creation of new enforcement authority 
is not rare. The newly established Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau (CFPB) is just one agency that has recently been 
given authorization to enforce.
209
 It provides a clear example of 
an agency struggling to overcome the costs of specialized en-
forcement. As discussed above in Part III, new enforcement 
agencies are required to revisit issues that have already re-
ceived significant attention in older, more generalist enforce-
ment contexts. With respect to prosecutorial discretion, agen-
cies need to decide which defendants to charge and which 
defendants to let go.
210
 When agencies charge defendants, they 
need to decide an appropriate penalty.
211
 As they conduct inves-
tigations, they need to provide appropriate incentives to in-
formants, cooperators, and whistleblowers.
212
  
To date, the CFPB has had mixed success on these fronts. 
To its credit, the CFPB quickly established a policy relating to 
prosecutorial discretion. In the middle of 2013, the agency 
promulgated a guidance document on the factors that will af-
fect its exercise of enforcement discretion.
213
 At the highest lev-
el, these include the severity of the violation, the harm, and the 
party’s prior conduct.
214
 Usefully, the agency has made clear 
 
Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 572 n.195, 573 (2009) (discussing proposals); 
Mark Frederick Hoffman, Note, Decreasing the Costs of Jurisdictional Grid-
lock: Merger of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681 (1995); John D. 
Benson, Comment, Ending the Turf Wars: Support For a CFTC/SEC Consoli-
dation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1175 (1991). 
 207. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 115 (2008) (discussing preparing “for a 
potential merger of the CFTC and the SEC”). 
 208. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 10, at 1151–53 (discussing the diffi-
culties of consolidating and restructuring existing agencies). 
 209. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5562 (2012) (granting the CFPB enforcement 
authority). 
 210. See supra Part II.A. 
 211. See supra Part II.B. 
 212. See supra Part II.C. 
 213. See CFPB Bulletin 2013-06, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 
(June 25, 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201306_cfpb_bulletin 
_responsible-conduct.pdf. 
 214. Id. at 1 (noting the importance of “(1) the nature, extent, and severity 
of the violations identified; (2) the actual or potential harm from those viola-
tions; (3) whether there is a history of past violations; and (4) a party’s effec-
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that penalty reductions are available for what it calls “respon-
sible conduct,” a combination of compliance-oriented responses 
to violations that include identifying the violation internally, 
reporting it to the government, cooperating with any investiga-
tion, and remediating any harm.
215
 These are the correct con-
siderations for compliance efforts by violators and an early, 
clear statement of their importance is the correct approach for 
an enforcement agency. 
Other components of the enforcement process, though, are 
weaker. The CFPB policy designed to develop insider infor-
mation is brief and limited.
216
 It elicits information from mem-
bers of the public including current and former employees of vi-
olators or their competitors.
217
 It does not, though, explain how 
the agency will treat those insiders and others. Will they be 
subject to administrative or criminal enforcement actions if 
they disclose their own misconduct? Will they be protected from 
third-party sanctions?
218
 Will the agency provide financial re-
wards for information? A more detailed and forthcoming policy 
would provide useful guidance for those potentially motivated 
to come forward.  
Similarly, the CFPB has not clearly explained how it 
reaches a final penalty amount. Consider the agency’s first ma-
jor enforcement action against a payday lender—a November 
2013 settlement with Cash America.
219
 Cash America agreed to 
pay $5 million in penalties and $14 million in refunds. The set-
 
tiveness in addressing violations”).  
 215. Id. (obtaining reduced penalties is possible in cases where parties 
“proactively self-police for potential violations, promptly self-report to the Bu-
reau when it identifies potential violations, quickly and completely remediate 
the harm resulting from violations, and affirmatively cooperate with any Bu-
reau investigation above and beyond what is required.”). 
 216. See CFPB Bulletin 2011-05 (Enforcement and Fair Lending), 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 15, 2011), http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/12/CFPB_Enforcement_Bulletin_12-15-11.pdf. 
 217. Id. at 1 (seeking information from “current or former employees of po-
tential violators, contractors, vendors, and competitor companies”). 
 218. The policy includes generic references to statutory whistleblower pro-
tections in Dodd-Frank and the possibility of enforcement by the Secretary of 
Labor. Id. However, it does not indicate whether the CFPB will use treatment 
of whistleblowers as a consideration in its own enforcement actions.  
 219. The settlement resolved multiple alleged violations, including claims 
that the payday lender engaged in robo-signing practices, violated regulations 
on loans to servicemembers, and obstructed the investigation. See Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau Takes Action Against Payday Lender For Robo-
Signing, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Nov. 20, 2013), http:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau 
-takes-action-against-payday-lender-for-robo-signing. 
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tlement, though, provides no justification for the penalty 
amount.
220
 Instead, it simply indicates that it takes “into ac-
count the factors set forth” in the governing statute,
221
 “includ-
ing the substantial redress provided to consumers and Re-
spondent’s cooperation . . . .”
222
 The Bureau gave no explanation 
why this was a case requiring a $5 million civil penalty rather 
than a $1 million, $10 million, or $50 million case. 
As discussed above,
223
 clarity in the penalty process is espe-
cially important in the context of regulatory overlap. The CFPB 
regulates entities that also face aggressive, large penalties from 
other enforcement bodies. For instance, along with the SEC 
and others, the CFPB jointly regulates large financial institu-
tions, like J.P. Morgan Chase. In fact, in September 2013, the 
CFPB entered into a consent decree with Chase for violations 
relating to its credit card operations.
224
 The action was signifi-
cant—Chase was required to pay a $20 million civil penalty 
and provide an estimated $309 million in refunds to consum-
ers.
225
 On the same day, though, Chase also entered into a con-
sent decree with the SEC involving activities by traders fraudu-
lently overvaluing investments to conceal losses.
226
 This action 
produced a total penalty of $920 million to various regulators, 
including a $200 million penalty to the SEC.
227
 
It is certainly unusual to see two large, simultaneous, un-
 
 220. See Consent Order, Cash Am. Int’l, Inc., No. 2013-CFPB-0008 (Nov. 
20, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201311_cfpb_ 
cashamerica_consent-order.pdf. 
 221. Id. at 14. Federal Statute, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(c) (2012), requires the Bu-
reau to consider the size of financial resources and good faith of the person 
charged, the gravity of the violation or failure to pay, the severity of the risk to 
or losses of the consumer, the history of previous violations, and such other 
matters as justice may require. 
 222. See Consent Order, supra note 220, at 14.  
 223. See supra Part III.B. 
 224. See Consent Order, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2013-CFPB-
0007 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_ 
cfpb_jpmc_consent-order.pdf. 
 225. CFPB Orders Chase and JPMorgan Chase To Pay $309 Million Re-
fund for Illegal Credit Card Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 
(Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-orders 
-chase-and-jpmorgan-chase-to-pay-309-million-refund-for-illegal-credit-card 
-practices/. 
 226. Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 70,458, 107 SEC Docket 4 (Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://www 
.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70458.pdf. 
 227. See JPMorgan Chase Agrees To Pay $200 Million and Admits Wrong-
doing To Settle SEC Charges, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 19, 
2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/137053981 
9965. 
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related enforcement actions against the same entity, but the 
overall issue is common. How will the CFPB set its penalties 
compared to those imposed by the SEC (and vice versa)? While 
Chase clearly would prefer to avoid either penalty, it necessari-
ly must focus on the much larger SEC action. Because the en-
forcement agencies are separate, though, there is no guarantee 
of comparability. One option, discussed below, is agency coordi-
nation. An equally viable alternative, though, is penalty clarity. 
Both agencies should explain which cases require a $200 mil-
lion penalty and which cases deserve a $20 million sanction. 
The CFPB is a new agency and of course it will develop a 
pattern of penalties as time passes. Eventually this history will 
provide guidance to the entities it regulates. In the interim, 
though, we see a version of regulatory uncertainty—
enforcement uncertainty. The decision to create a new enforce-
ment agency, rather than vest enforcement responsibility in an 
existing body, inevitably creates these transition costs. Newly 
created enforcement agencies need to learn lessons and develop 
policies about enforcement, tasks that have already been ac-
complished in other agencies. These costs may be worth paying, 
but Congress should not incur them casually.  
B. CONSEQUENCES FOR COURTS: COMPARATIVE DEFERENCE 
The comparative strengths and weaknesses of specialized 
enforcement provide lessons for the courts as well. In particu-
lar, they should shape the judicial decision about setting the 
level of deference to agency enforcement choices. The case law 
on enforcement deference has frequently invoked two equali-
ties. First, the Supreme Court has expressed a notion of equal 
deference across enforcement agencies. If the DOJ would re-
ceive deference in a particular realm of criminal enforcement, 
the Court will defer to civil administrative agencies on the 
same grounds. For example, Heckler refused to closely scruti-
nize the decision not to bring an enforcement action.
228
 In doing 
so, the Supreme Court explicitly compared the choice not to en-
force to the decision of the executive not to indict in a criminal 
case, “a decision which has long been regarded as the special 
province of the Executive Branch.”
229
 Similarly, in Marshall v. 
Jerrico, the Supreme Court accepted an administrative struc-
ture where civil enforcement agencies received a financial in-
centive from increasing civil penalty recoveries.
230
 Because 
 
 228. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985). 
 229. Id. at 832. 
 230. Marshsall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980). 
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comparable incentives did not contaminate criminal prosecu-
tions, the Court applied equal deference to civil enforcement.
231
  
Second, courts have also applied notions of equality across 
different components of the enforcement process. Heckler estab-
lishes strong deference to the decision not to initiate enforce-
ment actions. Similarly strong deference applies when an ad-
ministrative agency decides to abandon an action and withdraw 
a claim that a regulated entity violated the law.
232
 With respect 
to the penalty imposed, the Court defers to the agency not only 
in terms of its size,
233
 but also in terms of its timing.
234
 The 
Court gives roughly equal (and strong) deference to all of these 
aspects of the enforcement process. 
With respect to judicial deference to agency enforcement, 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of generalist and spe-
cialist enforcement suggest that both of these equalities are 
misguided. Rather than equal deference, courts should look to a 
model of comparative deference. Different agencies and differ-
ent enforcement choices should receive different levels of defer-
ence. If deference is based on agency expertise at enforcement, 
courts should treat the deference given to a generalist enforcer, 
such as the Department of Justice, as the outer boundary of the 
deference given to the enforcement decisions of administrative 
agencies. Similarly, greater deference should be given agency 
decisions that are more specialized and more closely tied to the 
agency’s regulatory mission. 
As an initial example, consider claims of selective prosecu-
tion. As a general matter, federal prosecutions are virtually 
immune to these arguments.
235
 The Supreme Court has effec-
tively limited the defense to cases where the defendant can 
demonstrate that the government initiated the prosecution for 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Cuyahoga Valley R.R. Co. v. Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 6 (1985); see 
also Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1032–33 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (deferring to decision to settle enforcement action because decision to 
settle are “judgments—arising from considerations of resource allocation, 
agency priorities, and costs of alternatives—[that] are well within the agency’s 
expertise and discretion”). 
 233. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185–86 (1973). 
 234. Moog Indust. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413–14 (1958) (deciding that an 
order should apply immediately to a given entity is within agency discretion). 
 235. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996) (“Our 
cases delineating the necessary elements to prove a claim of selective prosecu-
tion have taken great pains to explain that the standard is a demanding 
one.”); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal jus-
tice system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prose-
cute.”). 
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constitutionally prohibited reasons, such as race or religion.
236
 
Despite its criminal law foundation, the reasons for this defer-
ence resonate strongly with administrative law doctrine. The 
Supreme Court has assumed that federal prosecutors are par-
ticularly well suited (and judges are particularly poorly placed) 
to engage in the tradeoffs necessary to making charging deci-
sions.
237
 As a result, the Supreme Court has assigned a “pre-
sumption of regularity” to federal indictments that is ordinarily 
not subject to selective prosecution challenges.
238
 
The Courts of Appeals have applied a principle of equal 
deference to administrative enforcement actions. These crimi-
nal law foundations rejecting selective prosecution claims have 
applied with the same strength when agencies bring civil en-
forcement claims.
239
 The arguments outlined in Part III, 
though, suggest that more scrutiny is likely to be appropriate 
in the administrative context. Administrative investigations 
are more likely to be shaped by the process of regulatory cap-
ture. Lack of public scrutiny produces underenforcement in or-
dinary times, while the opposite occurs in the wake of a regula-
tory failure. Because specialized agency enforcement is more 
subject to pressures from the political branches, more judicial 
scrutiny is likely to be warranted. Selective enforcement claims 
are more likely to have merit when the process of making those 
charging decisions is more vulnerable.  
Similarly, with respect to investigative choices, agencies 
should receive at least as much review as the DOJ. The deci-
sion to provide a favorable resolution to witnesses who assist in 
a prosecution receives some scrutiny now, largely through dis-
closure requirements. The government is required to reveal ex-
culpatory information to the defense, including information re-
lating to benefits provided to witnesses.
240
 It is unclear whether 
 
 236. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962). 
 237. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (“This broad discretion rests largely on the 
recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial 
review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general de-
terrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s rela-
tionship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily suscep-
tible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”). 
 238. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464. 
 239. See, e.g., Martex Farms, S.E. v. EPA, 559 F.3d 29, 32–33 (1st Cir. 
2009) (applying criminal law principles to reject selective prosecution argu-
ments in EPA enforcement action); Fog Cutter Capital Grp. Inc. v. SEC, 474 
F.3d 822, 826–27 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying Armstrong in SEC action); United 
States v. Sage Pharm., Inc., 210 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Arm-
strong in FDA enforcement action). 
 240. Criminal defendants are entitled to any information that is favorable 
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these constitutional disclosure requirements extend to civil en-
forcement cases.
241
 As a matter of policy, though, they should. 
To the extent that agencies provide benefits to witnesses, 
courts should provide at least as much scrutiny to them as they 
would in the case of a criminal prosecution.  
Finally, agency settlements should receive at least as much 
scrutiny as criminal plea agreements. Admittedly, the review of 
plea agreements in the criminal context is limited. However, it 
is still greater than the scrutiny courts give to agency enforce-
ment settlements.
242
 If agencies can be seen, on average, as less 
capable at generalist enforcement functions than the DOJ, the 
deference to this pure enforcement choice should also be less. 
This approach would suggest that courts have the deference 
calculus backwards—agency settlements need more scrutiny 
than a plea bargain with comparable consequences. 
To be sure, there are many other reasons for courts to defer 
(or not) to enforcement choices. The specialized expertise that 
enforcement agencies bring to the table is only one considera-
tion in setting the appropriate level of scrutiny that courts 
should apply. At the very least, the higher stakes in criminal 
prosecutions as compared to civil regulatory enforcement 
should affect the level of judicial deference. To the extent, 
though, that a rule of deference is based on the specialized en-
forcement skill of the charging agency, specialized enforcers 
and generalist enforcers should not be treated as identical. In-
stead, the deference to the generalist enforcer should place an 
outer boundary on the deference given to other agencies.  
In turn, courts should defer more to enforcement choices by 
administrative agencies that are closely tied to their regulatory 
mission. In many cases, actions labeled as “enforcement” deci-
sions really are substantive regulatory decisions. For example, 
compare the foundational cases of Butz v. Glover Livestock
243
 
and Moog v. Federal Trade Commission.
244
 Butz, discussed 
 
to the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This protection ex-
tends to information that relates to the credibility of government witnesses. 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972).  
 241. See Mister Disc. Stockbrokers v. SEC, 768 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 
1985) (refusing to apply Brady in securities enforcement action); NLRB v. 
Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding Brady unavaila-
ble in NLRB actions). 
 242. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires a detailed process for 
accepting a guilty plea, including establishing that a factual basis for the plea 
exists. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). No comparable requirement exists for most 
civil enforcement settlements. 
 243. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973). 
 244. Moog Indus. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958). 
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above,
245
 set a strong standard of deference to agency penalty 
choices. Courts will provide only very limited review of the 
sanction imposed for administrative violations.
246
 In Moog, the 
Court confronted a request to review an agency’s decision to de-
lay (or not) an order enjoining an anticompetitive practice.
247
 
The target of the order argued that the practice was wide-
spread in the industry and sought to postpone its imposition 
until other market participants were subject to the same re-
quirement.
248
 The Court rejected this argument and deferred to 
the agency decision.
249
  
In light of the discussion in Part III, Moog is likely correct. 
The decision to impose a requirement on only one entity or the 
entire market is not a mere generalist enforcement choice. It is 
deeply intertwined with the agency’s specialized mission. At 
the core, it is a decision whether to engage in policymaking by 
rule or adjudication.
250
 As a result, deference to the agency deci-
sion is appropriate here. The decision draws on specialized 
agency knowledge, not broad “enforcement” capabilities. 
In contrast, the deference to penalty choices is more com-
plex. The order at issue in Butz itself was effectively injunctive 
in nature—the agency imposed a cease-and-desist order on the 
violator, required him to keep accurate records, and suspended 
him from the industry for a brief period.
251
 This decision fits 
naturally in the type of remedy where we should expect special-
ized agencies to shine. It draws on industry expertise, not ge-
neric enforcement knowledge.  
That deference, though, has not been limited to orders that 
are injunctive in nature. Numerous courts of appeals have ex-
tended Butz to civil penalties.
252
 This decision is much more dif-
ficult to defend. Penalty calculation involves significant gener-
alist enforcement expertise. Specialized, industry-specific 
knowledge matters far less when the sanction is the equivalent 
of a fine rather than a compliance order.
253
 As a result, courts 
 
 245. See supra Section I.A. 
 246. Butz, 411 U.S. at 185–87. 
 247. 355 U.S. at 413. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
 251. 411 U.S. at 184. 
 252. See, e.g., VanCook v. SEC, 653 F.3d 130, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2011) (apply-
ing Butz to SEC penalty); Vidiksis v. EPA, 612 F.3d 1150, 1154 (11th Cir. 
2010) (EPA penalty); Sultan Chemists, Inc. v. EPA, 281 F.3d 73, 83 (3d Cir. 
2002) (same).  
 253. See supra Section III.C. 
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should defer less when the sanction is monetary.  
None of this analysis answers the ultimate question about 
the absolute level of judicial discretion in the enforcement con-
text. Others have certainly argued persuasively that Heckler, 
for example, sets the bar of judicial review too low.
254
 This may 
well be correct—understanding that specialized enforcement 
has strengths and weaknesses compared to generalist enforcers 
does not identify the right level of deference to agency enforce-
ment decisions in the abstract. Nor does it predict the appro-
priate level of deference to enforcement choices compared to 
other agency decisions. Instead, it suggests the appropriate rel-
ative level of deference within the universe of enforcement 
choices. Enforcement choices made by specialized agencies 
within their area of expertise should receive more deference 
than choices by those same agencies that require enforcement 
knowledge more generally. Similarly, for enforcement choices 
that are outside that realm and are more general in nature, 
courts should defer less to agencies than to a generalist enforc-
er.  
C. CONSEQUENCES FOR AGENCIES: COLLABORATIVE 
ENFORCEMENT 
Perhaps the most important normative response to the 
current structure of agency enforcement is the most straight-
forward. Enforcers need to collaborate and coordinate enforce-
ment actions. Other scholars have strongly advocated for coor-
dination of enforcement functions in specific contexts.
255
 The 
costs and benefits outlined in the sections above support and 
 
 254. Soon after Heckler came down, Cass Sunstein advocated for permit-
ting challenges to nonenforcement decisions based on certain identified 
grounds: constitutionally impermissible factors; absence of jurisdiction; statu-
torily irrelevant factors; patterns of nonenforcement; refusals to enforce; and 
failures to initiate rulemakings. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction 
After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675–83 (1985). More recent 
critiques have proposed even more searching review of inaction. See Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 182 (1996) (argu-
ing for a Chenery-style review requiring an agency to state its reasons); Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Ap-
proach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1686 (2004) (advocating arbitrariness review); 
Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369, 372 
(2009) (advocating for an administrative agency response).  
 255. See, e.g., Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow, Conclusion, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 249, 250–52 (emphasizing 
the value of cross-enforcer coordination in the deferred prosecution context); 
Zimmerman, supra note 161, at 556–57 (noting that agency enforcement ac-
tions should be responsive to private class action litigations); Id. at 557 n.283 
(identifying others making similar arguments). 
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extend these recommendations. The relative weaknesses of 
specialized and generalist enforcers can be largely eliminated 
when paired with the corresponding strengths of their counter-
parts.  
At the charging stage, joint enforcement actions between 
enforcement agencies can leverage the expertise of the general-
ist enforcer in allocating responsibility between individuals and 
corporations. It also takes advantage of the industry expertise 
of the specialist. By ensuring that specialized enforcers have 
input at the charging stage, all enforcement agencies can avoid 
undermining valuable industry norms of compliance. Similarly, 
expert agency input can help target enforcement actions in ar-
eas where those norms need to be strengthened.  
Joint resolutions have similar benefits. A global resolution 
by multiple enforcers can reduce or eliminate the silo effect de-
scribed above. By simultaneously concluding charges brought 
by multiple agencies, the incentives of the target of the en-
forcement action and the public enforcers are brought into 
alignment. Consequences that would otherwise be collateral to 
the action become direct and, as a result, are subject to negotia-
tion between the defendant and the agencies. Similarly, the 
problems of scaling penalties are reduced. If all enforcers ob-
tain their penalties simultaneously, they are far more likely to 
be set in coordination with one another. Finally, if a specialist 
agency is involved in the resolution of the enforcement action, 
it will have the opportunity to participate in any settlement re-
quiring ongoing monitoring. As discussed above, there are 
strong reasons to believe that specialist agencies are much bet-
ter positioned to monitor ongoing conduct than a generalist en-
forcer.  
Despite these benefits, enforcement coordination is far 
from inevitable. As the Supreme Court has recognized, public 
enforcement can be competitive.
256
 Federal agencies compete 
horizontally for enforcement targets—most famously, the SEC 
and the CFTC have had jurisdictional clashes.
257
 Federal and 
state agencies compete vertically as they chase similar en-
forcement actions. This competition is especially fierce when 
 
 256. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (justifying magis-
trate’s involvement in the probable cause process given “the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime”). 
 257. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 103, at 902 (discussing the differ-
ence between horizontal and vertical enforcement and collecting sources on 
SEC/CFTC competition). 
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the dollars involved are large.
258
 
In practice, enforcement coordination does occur and is fre-
quently successful. Major enforcement actions now often in-
volve simultaneous resolution by multiple agencies. As one ex-
ample, the September 2013 fraud settlement described above 
led to not only a $200 million civil penalty for the SEC, but a 
total of $920 million in penalties to federal and international 
regulators.
259
 These case-by-case collaborations are increasingly 
common and extremely valuable.
260
  
Enforcement agencies, though, are less likely to take the 
important second step and collaborate across enforcement re-
gimes. Collaboration mostly happens in individual actions and 
on an ad hoc basis.
261
 Equally important, though, agencies need 
to coordinate at the policy level. Return again to the example of 
penalty calculation. Penalty coordination is extremely im-
portant in individual cases, but conveying the appropriate mes-
sage to regulated entities requires more. Systems of penalties 
need coordination as well. However, for many agencies, this 
level of cross-agency communication is impossible, because they 
have not taken the first step of clearly identifying their method 
for calculating penalties in the agency itself. External coordina-
tion cannot precede internal coordination. 
Similar questions arise with cooperators, informants, and 
whistleblowers. To the extent that potential cooperators pro-
vide information disclosing their own misconduct, they need to 
know how that disclosure will affect liability in all enforcement 
regimes, not merely the one maintained by the agency first re-
ceiving the information. As is true with penalty calculations, 
though, agencies that have not yet reached an internal decision 
how to handle cooperators cannot engage in cross-agency col-
laboration on their treatment.
262
 
 
 258. Id. (describing the effect of financial incentives on enforcement compe-
tition). 
 259. See supra note 227. The other regulators involved were the U.K. Fi-
nancial Conduct Authority, the Federal Reserve, and the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency. Id.  
 260. Brandon L. Garrett, Collaborative Organizational Prosecution, in 
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 36, at 154, 155 (“[P]rosecutors 
and regulators collaborate in joint adjudication. What has been little recog-
nized is that many federal organizational prosecution agreements were nego-
tiated jointly with regulatory agencies.”). 
 261. Id. (noting the problem and arguing for greater policy coordination 
across agencies).  
 262. In some cases, agencies have tried to coordinate their whistleblower 
programs. For example, the SEC and the CFTC have made significant efforts 
to make the programs comparable. Of course, defense counsel have quickly 
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Finally, enforcement regimes should not just be coordinat-
ed with each other enforcement regime. As described above,
263
 
one of the key advantages of specialized agency enforcement is 
the availability of other agency tools to achieve regulatory 
goals, either instead of or in addition to enforcement actions. 
Regulatory agencies need to use these tools respond to the 
problems identified by enforcement actions, either the agency’s 
own investigations or those brought by a generalist enforcer 
like the DOJ. Through substantive law promulgated in rules, 
the specialist agency can respond to enforcement problems with 
non-enforcement solutions.  
  CONCLUSION   
Should agencies enforce? Certainly. Agency enforcement 
authority is not just desirable, it is now inevitable. This Article 
demonstrates, though, that it is not an unmixed blessing. Spe-
cialized enforcement produces costs along with its benefits. Ef-
fective enforcement in complicated industries requires mastery 
of two areas. Agencies must develop both generalist enforce-
ment capacity and industry-specific knowledge. Specialized 
agencies start with an advantage in the second step, but at the 
expense of the first. Agencies also bring structural strengths 
and weaknesses to the enforcement process. Regulatory capture 
of the enforcement process becomes more serious as the agency 
focus narrows. Furthermore, specialized agencies lack the ca-
pacity to see enforcement actions through the eyes of the tar-
get. They compensate, though, with a greater knowledge of the 
industry norms and by bringing other components of the ad-
ministrative process to bear on violations. Institutional ac-
tors—Congress, the courts, and agencies themselves—need to 
consider these strengths and weaknesses as they respond to 
and shape the agency enforcement process.  
 
 
identified and focused on the gaps between the programs. See, e.g., Thomas W. 
White et al., CFTC and SEC Whistleblower Bounties: Largely Similar but Im-
portant Differences Remain, WILMERHALE (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www 
.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=94288.  
 263. See supra Section III.C. 
